## 1AC Round 3

## 1AC – Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should implement the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement

## 1AC – Solvency

#### Now is the time to lock in bilateral framework for energy cooperation

Wood 13 [Duncan, Mexico Institute director “Growing Potential for U.S.-Mexico Energy Cooperation”, <http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wood_energy.pdf>, p. 44]

The potential for effective collaboration between the two countries on questions on energy and climate change is huge. As a region, North America currently offers the most positive outlook in the world in terms of cheap, clean energy, largely thanks to the shale revolution that has taken place in recent years. Moreover, also thanks to shale, the United States, Canada and Mexico all have the chance to become energy independent and become net energy exporters to the world. The governments of the U.S. and Mexico should therefore undertake intensive discussions early in the new administrations to identify priority areas in the short- and medium-terms and should create institutional mechanisms through which these priorities can be pursued. In many cases these discussions will be bilateral, but on some long-term issues, such as climate change, for example, it makes sense to adopt a more regional approach, incorporating Canada into the process.

As Mexico undertakes a new energy reform process, the landscape for hydrocarbons and electricity will be subject to significant change. Mexico’s new government has decided that the existing state-led approach to oil and gas exploitation is no longer valid, and no longer serves the interests of the nation. This change will offer new opportunities for U.S. firms and potential competitiveness gains for the American economy. The establishment of a clear agenda for talks on bilateral cooperation is therefore a priority that should not be underestimated.

#### Mexico has already said yes and ratified the bill—they are just waiting for the US

**Velarde 12** – (Rogelio Lopez Velarde, attorney and counselor-at-law, held various positions at Pemex during 1988-1993, including that of Financial Advisor to the Finance Department, In-House Counsel in Houston, Texas, In-House Counsel in New York, and Head of the International Legal Department of Pemex. He was honored with the “Most Distinguished Attorney Award” of Pemex for the period 1990-1991, former Chairman of the Energy Committee of the Mexican Bar Association, and currently he is the President for the Latin America Chapter of the Association of the International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), as Visiting Professor of Judicial Process on the Mexican Legal Studies Program at the University of Houston Law Center, and he is currently the director of the Energy Law Seminar organized between the Universidad Iberoamericana and the Mexican Bar Association. “US-Mexican treaty on Gulf of Mexico transboundary reservoirs”, International Law Office, 3-19-2012, http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=b9326bf8-f27f-43ff-b45a-1b2b70ccb217andredir=1)

The treaty will become effective 60 days after the last notification of approval has been made by Mexico or the United States. In this regard, the Mexican Senate ratified the treaty in April 2012; therefore, the treaty's effectiveness is subject to approval and publication by the United States, which to date has neither ratified nor published the treaty.

## 1AC – Relations

#### Relations high – energy co-op key to sustainability

Brown and Meacham 12

(Neil, and Carl, ¶ current program director at CSIS, served at the Department of Commerce as special assistant to the deputy secretary, at the Cuban Affairs Bureau of the Department of State, and at the U.S. embassy in Madrid, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Oil, Mexico, And The Transboundary Agreement,” <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDgQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foreign.senate.gov%2Fpublications%2Fdownload%2Foil-mexico-and-the-transboundary-agreement&ei=qtPQUfzNJsisiALYloHwCw&usg=AFQjCNEZsmcfgXzQ0omtPqf8HklAkTjfxA&sig2=PORZ6WJw6OEYk7MPmfWKbw&bvm=bv.48572450,d.cGE>, P. 13, Accessed: 6/30/13)

U.S.-Mexico bilateral cooperation has improved dramatically in¶ the last 5 years. Mexican sensitivities regarding their sovereignty¶ are still present in government dealings. But today they don’t prevent¶ bilateral cooperation, as they did in the recent past. As evidence¶ in this regard, we have seen a significant increase in Mexico’s¶ efforts to institutionalize and even expand cooperation among¶ both civilian and military officials.¶ The willingness to improve Mexican cooperation with the United¶ States is partly due to the trust developed through the successful¶ partnership the U.S. and Mexican governments have built while¶ working against drug trafficking organizations. The $1.9 billion¶ Me´rida Initiative through which the United States provides equipment,¶ training, and technical assistance to support the Mexican¶ government’s battle against the narcotics trade and transnational¶ crime has created a platform for greater bilateral cooperation.¶ Today, our two nations work closer than ever before. Yet, there¶ are still new areas in which the bilateral relationship should improve.¶ Interlocutors both from the then-existing Caldero´n administration¶ and senior advisers to then-incoming Pen˜ a Nieto administration¶ expressed a similar desire to expand cooperation in the bilateral¶ relationship. One senior member of the then-incoming Pen˜ a¶ Nieto administration expressed that it is time to move beyond tourism¶ and drugs, issues which are so prominent in the bilateral da today.11 Of course, the development of a contemporary, comprehensive¶ immigration policy ranks high when broadening the¶ agenda is discussed.¶ The U.S. is well positioned to increase dialogue and cooperation¶ on energy security with Mexico (included in renewable power and¶ efficiency, which were not part of this review, but which are areas¶ where cooperation can move forward without significant political¶ obstacles from the Mexican side).

#### **Energy and economic ties key to broader relations – plan solves**

Farnsworth 13 [Eric, May 8, “Obama’s Mexico Trip Yielded Progress, Missed Opportunities” [http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12934/obama-s-mexico-trip-yielded-progress-missed-opportunities 6/29/13](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12934/obama-s-mexico-trip-yielded-progress-missed-opportunities%206/29/13)]

President Barack Obama traveled to Mexico City on May 2 to meet with new Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in an effort to recast perceptions of the bilateral agenda from security to economic issues. In 2012, for the first time in 12 years, the U.S. and Mexican election cycles coincided, providing an excellent opportunity to coordinate an agenda consistent with the political needs of the new administrations and the economic requirements of their respective countries. An early visit by the U.S. president was an important signal that Mexico’s significant contributions to the health of the U.S. economy can no longer be taken for granted; the bond must be strengthened in order to assure the global competitiveness of both Mexico and the United States.

Mexico is the United States’ third-largest trading partner, after Canada and China, and its second-biggest export market, after Canada. Some $1.4 billion worth of goods crosses the U.S.-Mexico border every day, and an estimated 6 million U.S. jobs depend directly on trade with Mexico. These are big numbers, and they are only going to increase, particularly as Mexico’s economy grows and its middle class expands, increasing its purchasing power.

At the same time, a number of obstacles to growth must be addressed if the bilateral relationship is to reach its full potential. Many of these are domestic issues that each nation should resolve for its own self-interest but that would nonetheless meaningfully improve the bilateral economic relationship. Among these are, from Mexico’s side, reforms in fiscal, energy and competition policy, as well as the continuing implementation of labor and education reforms. Working with Mexico’s other two main political parties, Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) has successfully begun the reform process. But the Mexican president’s honeymoon period is coming to an end, and the most difficult issues remain unresolved.

#### Plan is reverse causal - Failure to pass THA kills relations- Mexico would perceive it as a violation of trust

CFR 12 – United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Super Qualified Authors, 12/21/12, (“OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT”, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm>, AW)

Finally, passage of the TBA would boost U.S.-Mexico relations on energy issues, which have traditionally lagged. Mexican officials roundly expressed support for the TBA and expectation for U.S. ratification in conversation with the authors. The political impact of not approving and implementing the TBA would set back U.S.-Mexican relations on energy specifically and more broadly. Each of our countries has hot button domestic political issues that take courage for political leaders to address. In Mexico, oil is one such issue, and members of both the PAN and PRI put their political weight behind ratification in Mexico. The U.S. not fulfilling its side of the agreement would, therefore, be seen as a violation of trust and could erode confidence. In the extreme, although unlikely, if Mexico proceeds with domestic energy reforms, U.S. companies could be shut out of certain opportunities until the TBA is ratified. However, bilateral benefits of approving the agreement do not require immediate passage; U.S. commitment can be demonstrated by the Obama administration formally submitting the TBA for Congressional approval and commencement of Congressional hearings.

#### That’s key to solve bioterror- method cooperation

Rosales et al 11- MD has worked in the health arena for more than 20 years and in public health over 15 years, after serving five years as Director, Office of Border Health for the Arizona Department of Health Services. Dr. Rosales has expertise in program development and implementation, public health administration, policy and health disparities research in the Southwest, (Cecilia, “U.S.Mexico cross-border workforce training needs:survey implementation”, January 2011, Journal of Injury and Violence Research at Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3134923/>,)

Abinational border-wide, online assessment on preparedness/emergency response and workforce training needs of personnel dedicated to the U.S.-Mexico border region was ommissioned by the ten U.S.-Mexico border state health offices through the U.S.-Mexico Border Governor’s Conference. The overarching goal of the study was to provide the Border States with information that could serve to orient, train, and evaluate the workforce charged with public health emergency preparedness and response as well as future preparedness personnel. The primary objective of the study was to assess and prioritize bioterrorism, infectious disease, and border training needs critical for responding to intentional and unintentional emergencies along the border region. The study was to describe the characteristics, learning preferences, proficiency and educational needs of the emergency preparedness and response workforce operating in the counties located in the U.S. border area. This area was defined by the La Paz Agreement and Public Law 103-400 (U.S. – Mexico Border Health Commission) as 100 kilometers north and south of the international boundary. The relative lack of literature addressing U.S.-Mexico cross-border issues related to emergency preparedness and bioterrorism highlights the importance of this assessment. This study describes and provides results of the assessment conducted with the four U.S. Border States and two Mexico Border States. While the study was mandated for all ten states funding was only provided for border cities within six states. Funding of transborder studies has been challenging for researchers focused on border health issues. The state of Sonora, sister state to Arizona, and the state of Chihuahua, sister state to Texas, were both successful in securing the resources to survey the preparedness and response workforce.

#### Also solves conventional terrorism

Mariclaire Acosta 12 – Project Director, Freedom House – Mexico Bill Bratton Chairman, Kroll Advisory Solutions, former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department and former New York City Police Commissioner Geoffrey Cowan President, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands John Engler President, Business Roundtable, former Governor of Michigan Rafael Fernández de Castro Chair, Department of International Studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, former Foreign Policy Advisor to President Calderón Michael Govan CEO and Wallis Annenberg Director, Los Angeles County Museum of Art Jane Harman Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center, former Member of Congress Carlos Heredia Director of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE, former Member of Congress Phil Heymann James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, former Deputy Attorney General Barry Jackson Chief of Staff to the Speaker of the House John Boehner Enrique Krauze Historian and Essayist, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Letras Libres Isaac Lee President, News, Univision Communications Inc. Emilio Lozoya Chairman, JFH Lozoya Investments Mel Martinez Chairman, Florida, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean for JPMorgan Chase & Co., Chairman, JPMorgan Chase Foundation Doris Meissner Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, former Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, (“Policy Recommendations for U.S.-Mexico Relations”, <http://sunnylands.org/files/posts/159/stronger_f.pdf>, AW)

At the same time, the United States faces a major challenge in ensuring the safety of its citizens against terrorist attacks, and it depends significantly on intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation from its two neighbors, Mexico and Canada. Indeed, this cooperation has been one of the untold stories of engagement between U.S. and Mexican federal agencies over the past decade, with the result that the U.S.-Mexico border has not yet been used for terrorist activities. However, continued vigilance and more sophisticated forms of cooperation will be needed to avoid the evolving threats from terrorist organizations. Policy oPtion: Develop border ports of entry that ensure safety and strengthen trade by employing risk-management techniques and the latest technology. Indeed, one of the greatest opportunities for binational cooperation on security, which would help address both Mexican concerns about transnational organized crime and U.S. concerns about terrorism, would be to develop more sophisticated approaches to managing ports of entry at the border. By using risk management techniques and the latest technology, the two countries could develop more effective ways of detecting potential threats, ranging from drugs to firearms to bombs, and simultaneously facilitate commerce and the exchange of people across the border. While much attention has been focused on beefing up security between ports of entry, the reality is that most of the real threats to the two countries are at the ports of entry rather than between them. A new focus on these could be a win-win for both countries and for both security and trade. Cooperation on Global Issues and Foreign Policy For the United States, Mexico is a key partner in international affairs. Mexico works hard to protect the United States from terrorist threats and to weaken transnational organized crime groups. It is a middle income country, currently holds the presidency of the G-20, and is expected to grow steadily for many years to come. Jim O’Neil of Goldman Sachs, for example, expects Mexico to have the seventh largest economy in the world by 2020. Mexico has long served as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, and the U.S. can take advantage of this fact by working closely with Mexico on issues of common interest.

#### Biological terrorist attack would cause extinction

Kellman ‘08[Barry, Director of the International Weapons Control Center at the DePaul University College of Law and author of Bioviolence—Preventing Biological Terror and Crime; “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat,” The Futurist, May-June 2008, http://www.wfs.org/March-April09/MJ2008\_Kellman.pdf]

What Might Bioviolence Accomplish? Envision a series of attacks against capitals of developing states that have close diplomatic linkages with the United States. The attacks would carry a well-publicized yet simple warning: “If you are a friend of the United States, receive its officials, or support its policies, thousands of your people will get sick.” How many attacks in how many cities would it take before international diplomacy, to say nothing of international transit, comes to a crashing halt? In comparison to use of conventional or chemical weapons, the potential death toll of a bioattack could be huge. Although the number of victims would depend on where an attack takes place, the type of pathogen, and the sophistication of the weapons maker, there is widespread consensus among experts that a heightened attack would inflict casualties exceedable only by nuclear weapons. In comparison to nuclear weapons, bioweapons are far easier and cheaper to make and transport, and they can be made in facilities that are far more difficult to detect. The truly unique characteristic of certain bioweapons that distinguishes them from every other type of weapon is contagion. No other type of weapon can replicate itself and spread. Any other type of attack, no matter how severe, occurs at a certain moment in time at an identifiable place. If you aren’t there, you are angry and upset but not physically injured by the attack. An attack with a contagious agent can uniquely spread, potentially imperiling target populations far from where the agents are released. A bio-offender could infect his minions with a disease and send them across borders before symptoms are obvious. Carriers will then spread it to other unsuspecting victims who would themselves become extended bioweapons, carrying the disease indiscriminately. There are challenges in executing such an attack, but fanatical terrorist organizations seem to have an endless supply of willing suicide attackers. All this leads to the most important characteristic of bioviolence: It raises incomparable levels of panic. Contagious bioviolence means that planes fly empty or perhaps don’t fly at all. People cancel vacation and travel plans and refuse to interact with each other for fear of unseen affliction. Public entertainment events are canceled; even going to a movie becomes too dangerous. Ultimately, bioviolence is about hiding our children as everyone becomes vulnerable to our most fundamental terror: the fear of disease. For people who seek to rattle the pillars of modern civilization and perhaps cause it to collapse, effective use of disease would set in motion political, economic, and health consequences so severe as to call into question the ability of existing governments to maintain their citizens’ security. In an attack’s wake, no one would know when it is over, and no government could credibly tell an anxious population where and when it is safe to resume normal life. While it is difficult to specify when this danger will strike, there should be no doubt that we are vulnerable to a rupture. Just as planes flying into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, instantly became a historical marker dividing strategic perspectives before from after, the day that disease is effectively used as an instrument of hate will profoundly change everything. If you want to stop modern civilization in its tracks, bioviolence is the way to go. The notion that no one will ever commit catastrophic bioviolence is simply untenable.

#### **Now is key – bioterror threats increasing**

Garrett, 1/5**/**12 [Laurie, Senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, recipient of the 1996 Pulitzer Prize for her coverage of the Ebola epidemic in what was then Zaire, and author of I Hear the Sirens Scream: How American Responded to the 9/11 and Anthrax Attacks; “Flu Season,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/05/flu\_season]

Meanwhile, bird flu is back, causing human and bird infections and deaths in Hong Kong, mainland China, India, Bangladesh, and Egypt. A Shenzhen bus driver died of H5N1on Dec. 31; the source of his infection has not been determined. Nature carries out its own mutations. Indeed, all five of the mutations that were the key in Fouchier's experiments to transforming garden-variety bird flu into a supercontagious mammalian killer have already occurred separately in nature. Yes, the birds and viruses have already done it -- but not with all five mutations in a single viral strain. The biological clock is ticking. In late December, the U.S. CDC issued a warning, noting that yet another flu threat looms, combining the 2009 H1N1 "swine flu" with a H3N2 influenza now circulating in American commercial pig farms. The naturally occurring recombinant flu had infected a dozen Americans by Christmas.

#### High risk of nuclear terrorism – acquisition and ideological motivation

Graham T. Allison 7 – Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 4/20/07, (“How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?”, <http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097>, AW)

A final comment on the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack before turning more specifically to terrorist motivations. We should ask ourselves every day: Are nuclear materials that could fuel a terrorist's bomb more or less secure than they were a year ago? Thanks to initiatives like the Nunn-Lugar program, highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia are far safer from theft today than they were in the early 1990s. But the risk that terrorists will buy or steal nuclear material from a rogue state increases as more countries acquire the ability to produce weapons-usable material. Therefore it is vitally important to roll back North Korea's nuclear program and to constrain Iran before it reaches its enrichment finish line. By becoming a nuclear-armed state, each will trigger a cascade of proliferation in its neighborhood. What about the motivation of terrorists that have attacked the American homeland? Al-Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith has stated al-Qaeda's objective: "to kill 4 million Americans—2 million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands." As he explains, this is what justice requires to balance the scales for casualties supposedly inflicted on Muslims by the United States and Israel. Michael Levi argues, correctly, that such a tally could be reached in a series of smaller installments, and our national security would benefit from insights into how to prevent such events. But ask yourself how many 9/11s it would take to reach that goal. Answer: 1,334, or one nuclear weapon. Jihadi terrorists are not solely interested in murdering Americans. They are also vying for Muslim "hearts and minds" by demonstrating that al-Qaeda is the "strong horse." Bin Laden has challenged his followers to trump 9/11. The London and Madrid train bombings set a bar: the first major bombing by Islamic terrorists on each country's soil. Al-Qaeda's next UK plot was more audacious, and had it been successful, it would have taken more lives. It is not clear that al-Qaeda can be deterred. Osama bin Laden describes the current conflict as a clash between the Muslim ummah [community of believers] and the "Jewish-Christian crusaders." A nuclear terrorist attack, like the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would be a world-changing event. Bin Laden well might accept significant risk of failure for a chance to draw battle lines in his clash of civilizations. Analysts with a deeper understanding of terrorist motivations should be challenged to propose policy initiatives that leverage that knowledge, particularly where those insights help us to prevent what Dr. Levi and I both agree would be the single greatest catastrophe: nuclear terrorism.

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction –escalates to Russia and China

Ayson 10 – Robert Ayson 10, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible thatsome sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where **an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war**. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors**.** Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhapsIran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan**.** But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil mightalso raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism(as discussed earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

## 1AC – Trade

#### **The trade deficit is expanding**

Reuters 9-4 (Reuters, September 04, 2013 “U.S. Trade Deficit Widens in July,” <http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/2013/09/04/us-trade-deficit-widens-in-july/>, zs)

The U.S. trade deficit widened slightly more than expected in July as exports dipped, but a rebound in imports pointed to some firming in underlying domestic demand early in the third quarter. The Commerce Department said on Wednesday the trade gap increased 13.3 percent to $39.1 billion. June's shortfall on the trade balance was revised to $34.5 billion from the previously reported $34.2 billion. Economists polled by Reuters had expected the trade deficit to widen to $38.7 billion in July. When adjusted for inflation, the trade gap expanded to $47.7 billion from $43.8 billion in June. This measure goes into the calculation of gross domestic product. Trade's contribution to GDP growth in the second quarter was neutral, but economists expect it to add to growth this quarter and the rise in the so-called real trade deficit is probably not enough to change that view. The economy grew at a 2.5 percent annual rate in the April-June quarter, stepping up from the first-quarter's 1.1 percent pace. "We expect some narrowing in the trade deficit in the third quarter. It's consistent with some pickup in the global demand," said Yelena Shulyatyeva, an economist at BNP Paribas in New York. The three-month moving average of the trade deficit, which irons out month-to- month volatility, decreased to $39.1 billion in the three months to July from $39.3 billion in the prior period. The increase in imports in July, which reflected rises in industrial supplies, automobiles and consumer goods, suggested some strengthening in domestic demand. Imports of goods and services rose 1.6 percent to $228.6 billion. Imports of autos, parts and engines were the highest on record in July. Exports of goods and services dipped 0.6 percent to $189.4 billion in July. However, exports of petroleum products hit a record high. U.S. financial markets showed little reaction to the trade data, with attention focused on the debate in the United States over whether to take action in war-torn Syria. Weak overseas demand, especially in Europe, has caused an ebb in export growth after trade helped to lift the U.S. economy out of the 2007-09 recession. But there are signs the global economy is picking up and U.S. manufacturers have also been reporting an increase in export orders. The Institute for Supply Management said on Tuesday its gauge of new export orders rebounded in August after slipping in July. In July, exports to the 27-nation European Union fell 7.4 percent resulting in a record trade deficit. Exports to the EU in the first seven months of the year were down 4.4 percent compared to the same period in 2012. Exports to China fell 4.9 percent. China has been one of the fastest-growing markets for U.S. goods, but growth there has slowed in recent months and exports to that country were up just 4.0 percent for the first seven months of 2013. Imports from China jumped 8.3 percent in July, lifting the contentious U.S. trade deficit with China to a record $30.1 billion.

#### Offshore drilling solves trade deficit – reduces necessity for oil imports

Priest, 13 – (Tyler, “Should the U.S. Expand Offshore Oil Drilling?” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324020504578398610851042612.html)

The U.S. will be the world's largest per-capita consumer of crude oil for the foreseeable future. To help meet this demand and limit reliance on imports, the country will need to increase exploration for offshore oil. As the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster demonstrated, there are risks. Critics, however, too often exaggerate the risks, including the impacts of routine drilling operations on ecosystems, and understate the benefits. Expanding offshore drilling with appropriate site selection, oversight and attention to the lessons from Deepwater Horizon—already embodied in new rules on equipment, drilling and safety—should be a central objective of U.S. energy policy. Regardless of the progress we make in limiting our carbon addiction, kicking the habit won't happen easily or soon. The raw energy produced by a single offshore oil platform in 2010—BP BP.LN +1.02% PLC's Thunder Horse facility in the Gulf of Mexico—was equivalent to the electricity generated in 2012 by all the wind and solar installations in the U.S. combined. Offshore oil also does more than help satisfy our energy appetite. Annual federal proceeds from offshore leases have ranged as high as $18 billion in recent years, second only to income taxes as a revenue source. And every barrel of consumption that isn't imported helps ease the U.S. trade deficit.

#### Free trade on the brink – perception of US leadership key

Suominen 12 – resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, 7-6-12

(Kati, “America the Absent,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/06/america_the_absent?page=full>)

In the 20th century, beginning with the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944, America's great contribution was to champion an economic paradigm and set of institutions that promoted open markets and economic stability around the world. The successive Groups of Five, Seven, and Eight, first formed in the early 1970s, helped coordinate macroeconomic policies among the world's leading economies and combat global financial imbalances that burdened U.S. trade politics. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) spread the Washington Consensus across Asia and Latin America, and shepherded economies in transition toward capitalism. Eight multilateral trade rounds brought down barriers to global commerce, culminating in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Meanwhile, a wave of bank deregulation and financial liberalization began in the United States and proliferated around the world, making credit more available and affordable while propelling consumption and entrepreneurship the world over. The U.S. dollar, the world's venerable reserve currency, economized global transactions and fueled international trade. Central bank independence spread from Washington to the world and helped usher in the Great Moderation, which has produced a quarter-century of low and steady inflation around the world. Globalization was not wished into being: It was the U.S.-led order that generated prosperity unimaginable only a few decades ago. Since 1980, global GDP has quadrupled, world trade has grown more than sixfold, the stock of foreign direct investment has shot up by 20 times, and portfolio capital flows have surged to almost $200 trillion annually, roughly four times the size of the global economy. Economic reforms and global economic integration helped vibrant emerging markets emerge: The "Asian Tigers" (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) that boomed in the 1980s were joined in the 1990s by the awakening giants of Brazil, China, and India. It was the United States that quarterbacked the play, brokering differences among nations and providing the right mix of global public goods: a universal reserve currency, an open-trade regime, deep financial markets, and vigorous economic growth. Trade liberalization alone paid off handsomely, adding $1 trillion annually to the postwar U.S. economy. Talk about American decline notwithstanding, the economic order created by the United States persists. In fact, at first blush, it appears to have only been reinforced in the past few years. New institutions such as the G-20, a forum for the world's leading economies, and the Financial Stability Board, a watchdog for the international financial system, are but sequels to U.S.-created entities: the Group of Five and the Financial Stability Forum. Investors still view America as a financial safe haven, and the dollar remains the world's lead currency. Open markets have survived, and 1930s-style protectionism has not materialized. The WTO continues to resolve trade disputes and recently welcomed Russia as its 154th member, while the mission and resources of the Bretton Woods twins -- the World Bank and IMF -- have only expanded. No country has pulled out of these institutions; instead, emerging nations such as China and India are demanding greater power at the table. Countries have opted in, not out, of the American-led order, reflecting a reality of global governance: There are no rival orders that can yet match this one's promise of mutual economic gains. Still, while the American order is peerless, it is also imperiled. The deepening European debt crisis, discord over national policies to restore growth, and the all-but-dead Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations speak to the failures of the global economy's existing instruments to manage 21st-century challenges. Instead of coordinating policies, leading countries are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma, elbowing for an edge in world trade and jockeying for power on the world stage. Tensions simmer over issues such as exchange-rate manipulation, capital controls, creeping protectionism, and financial nationalism. Right at the moment when we most need to shore up the troubled global economic order, America -- the architect of this very order -- is failing to lead. Even as the United States remains pivotal to global growth, U.S. corporations -- the engines of the American economy -- are stifled by taxes, regulations, and policy uncertainty. Gaping fiscal deficits in the United States are undermining the dollar, exacerbating trade deficits, and undercutting U.S. economic dynamism and credibility in world affairs, but political posturing has obstructed the country's path to solvency. Earlier this week, the IMF warned that if political deadlock takes America to the so-called fiscal cliff of automatic tax hikes and spending cuts in January 2013, it could have a devastating impact on the U.S. and world economies. No wonder America's image as the global economic superpower is receding around the world. Europe's travails, meanwhile, are reducing U.S. companies' exports and overseas profits, threatening America's recovery. And yet Congress has balked at boosting the IMF's resources to fight the eurozone crisis while the Obama administration has deflected responsibility, framing the crisis as Europe's to manage. It has fallen to countries such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia to instead build the firewall that will shield the rest of the world from Europe. The welcome momentum in negotiations between the United States and Pacific Rim countries on the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement does not undo over three years of drift in U.S. trade policy that has jeopardized the very global trading system that the United States built and powered in the postwar era. The only trade deals that the Obama administration has passed -- with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea -- were launched and negotiated by the Bush administration. The world is now facing a triple threat of global economic instability, divisions among top powers, and a global leadership vacuum. This perfect storm could produce a world disorder of mercurial financial markets, widening global imbalances, spreading state capitalism, and beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism -- a scenario with a sorry past and few safe exits. In the late 1940s, a new world order arose because of American strength, vision, and leadership, not because global governance was in vogue. Leadership was never easy: Resistance from allies, protectionist pressures at home, and resource-draining wars all stood in the way. But capitalism spread, trade and financial markets were liberalized, and emerging-market crises were defeated. Global economic integration forged ahead. Today, American leadership is again essential.

#### Data proves resolving the deficit solves protectionism

Hufbauer 10 (Gary, Senior Chair at Council of Relations, “US Protectionist Impulses in the Wake of the Great Recession”, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer201003.pdf)

The U.S. unemployment rate more than doubled between the onset of the Great Recession in¶ December 2007 and December 2009, and is now hovering just below 10 percent (figure 1).¶ 1¶ Considering that this discouraging figure likely understates broader deterioration in the U.S.¶ labor market,¶ 2¶ the absence of sustained Congressional pressure for large‐scale protectionist¶ measures, beyond “Buy American” provisions and several smaller companions (all examined in¶ this report), is in some ways surprising.¶ 3¶ At least part of the explanation for the restrained political response is the simultaneous large¶ improvement in the U.S. trade balance during 2008 and early 2009. Figure 1 illustrates how the¶ total U.S. deficit in goods and services trade was nearly cut in half during this period, creating a¶ political obstacle to kneejerk protectionism. As we will elaborate in section IV, during recessions¶ an improving external balance (from imports falling faster than exports) often acts an¶ “automatic international economic stabilizer,” which temporarily fulfills an equivalent¶ economic function to a Keynesian government stimulus package. The “external sector” of the¶ U.S. economy during the early quarters of the Great Recession provided an “automatic offset”¶ to sliding U.S. economic activity. This probably caused policymakers to think twice about¶ succumbing to short‐term protectionist instincts.¶ However, figure 1 also shows how the improvement in the U.S. trade balance has been only¶ temporary and indeed began to reverse as the U.S. economy exited the Great Recession during¶ the second half of 2009. Crucial for the political threat of protectionism, economic forecasts¶ indicate that the U.S. unemployment rate will probably remain at very high levels over the¶ medium term, despite President Obama’s emphasis on “jobs, jobs, jobs” in his State of the¶ Union Address delivered on January 27¶ th¶ , 2010.¶ 4¶ A time lag of at least 12 to 18 months probably separates the point at which the U.S. trade¶ balance showed maximum improvement (spring 2009) and the expected drop in measured¶ unemployment well below 10 percent (fall 2010). Absent the “feel good” factor of an improving¶ trade balance, but facing continuing high unemployment levels, protectionist sentiment in the¶ U.S. Congress may increase in the coming months, especially as the November 2010 midterm¶ election draws near.¶ This is particularly so, as current economic forecasts suggest a more robust U.S. economic¶ recovery in the coming years, relative to other industrial trading partners (table 1). A large and¶ growing deficit in the U.S. external balances will likely persist for some time, while the external¶ balances of other major trading partners could hold steady or even improve. If the United¶ States thus returns to its “pre‐crisis role as the world’s importer/consumer of last resort,”¶ protectionist impulses in the U.S. Congress are destined to escalate.¶ 5¶ Fresh U.S. protectionist initiatives, at a time when the U.S. economy is growing at a decent pace,¶ will likely invite in‐kind retaliation by America’s trading partners, despite the relatively muted¶ reaction to the original “Buy American” provisions in early 2009 and other protectionist measures implemented since then. No longer facing a newly‐elected U.S. president, who¶ entered office with considerable global appeal in the midst of an unprecedented economic¶ crisis, foreign leaders are unlikely to give the U.S. an easy pass on future new instances of U.S.¶ protectionism.

#### Protectionism causes extinction

Panzer 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### Trade deficit destroys economy

Sherter 5/10/13 – (Alain, “How the U.S. trade gaps hurts the economy”, CBS, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123\_162-57431723/how-the-u.s-trade-gaps-hurts-the-economy/)

The global U.S. trade deficit rose in March at its fastest clip in 10 months, as sales of consumer goods coming from overseas outstripped gains in U.S. exports, according to new Commerce Department data. Despite Europe's financial woes, imports from the region jumped nearly 23 percent in March and hit a new high of roughly $35 billion. Since the U.S. economy officially started recovering in 2009, the trade deficit has doubled, notes economist Peter Morici. It's worth noting that many of those clothes, electronic gadgets, and other low-priced products coming into the U.S. from China and elsewhere are, in fact, goods made overseas by American companies. In theory, that should drive job-creation here in the states. The lower the price of, say, a Chinese-made flat-screen TV, the more units American consumers will buy. Rising demand for nice TVs is supposed to boost hiring, as U.S. companies gear up to fill orders. If only theory jibed better with reality. With the U.S. economy still showing symptoms of depression, demand has yet to fully rebound. Hiring remains slow. As the trade deficit has grown, meanwhile, U.S. businesses have moved a lot more jobs abroad in recent years than they've created at home. Between 1999 and 2008 U.S. multinationals slashed their domestic workforce by 1.9 million, while increasing overseas employment by 2.4 million, economist Martin Sullivan has shown. And it's not only about wages. The U.S. has lost more manufacturing jobs since 2000 than several countries that pay their workers more, including Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. Nor is it only about manufacturing. The number of financial services, IT, HR, and other white-collar jobs lost to offshoring has risen since the financial crisis. How does offshoring relate to America's growing trade deficit? Both stifle job-creation, which in turn is affected by U.S. trade policy. Since 2001, for example, the U.S. trade gap with China has resulted in a loss of 2.8 million jobs, according to the Economic Policy Institute, a Washington think-tank. More broadly, a widening deficit can act as a drag on the economy by muting the job-creating effects of consumer spending. Why? Because when people hit their local mall or big-box retailer, what they buy is mostly made abroad. That creates more jobs overseas than it does here. It also weakens the impact of government stimulus by reducing the "multiplier" effect you get when formerly unemployed workers in the U.S. suddenly have a job and money in their pockets. (Again, the idea there is that higher consumer spending drives hiring, which continues the virtuous circle by pushing up spending.)

#### Econ decline causes global conflict - studies

Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Free trade creates multiple disincentives for conflict, but it’s declining globally

Carafano, 12 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. senior research fellow for national security at the Heritage Foundation. “More Free Markets Will Mean Fewer Wars,” [http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/01/more-free-markets-will-mean-fewer-wars Accessed 6/30/12](http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/01/more-free-markets-will-mean-fewer-wars%20Accessed%206/30/12)

Sir Ralph Norman Angell had all the answers. In 1909, he published "Europe's Optical Illusion," a pamphlet arguing that the global integration of economies through trade and industrialization had made total war obsolete. The outbreak of World War I dented the theory somewhat. But such was the power of Angell's argument -- and the insight of European elites -- that he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933. World War II started six years later. Angell and others had missed a key point. It's not just the intensity of trade between nations that influences the tide of war and peace; the kind of nations engaged in trade matters as well. The old British adage "trade follows the flag" had an important postscript: "War often follows trade." When free-market nations rubbed up against mercantilist and other "not free" economies, the friction often produced bloodshed. On the other hand, economic activity between nations that share a commitment to economic freedom tends to flow peacefully, without rancor. Indeed, strong trade ties between free-market nations tend to actually promote national security. Economic freedom helps nations generate the wealth that allows them to defend themselves. Beyond that, it creates a community of nations with a shared interest: protecting their right to freely exchange goods, peoples, services and ideas. This common bond promotes the cause of peace by creating strong, self-reliant, sovereign and independent nations interested in preserving the mutual freedoms that allow them to engage commercially and prosper. Economic freedom hinges on an institutional framework that allows all individuals to exercise their liberties in the market place. In addition to accommodating free trade, that framework includes institutional commitments to fight corruption, protect property rights and the sanctity of contracts and pursue responsible fiscal policies. Each year, the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal produce an Index of Economic Freedom that measures 10 major components essential to economic freedom and assesses the state of virtually every economy in the world. The 2012 Index of Economic Freedom should be a wake-up call for the world. It found that, generally speaking, economic freedom is in decline throughout the globe. The decline is very real right here in the United States. For the second straight year, America has failed to qualify as a free economy; it rates as only "mostly free." As recently as 2008, the U.S. was a Top Five country in terms of economic freedom. This year, we barely managed a 10th place finish. The loss of freedom has been accompanied by a stagnant economy and persistently high unemployment. Reviving economic freedom is essential to growing the economy and creating jobs ... and for national security as well. Beyond getting our own house in order, encouraging and working with other nations to promote economic freedom is equally important. Washington needs to embrace ambitious policies that create economic dynamism, policies that will unshackle innovation, which leads to better products, new markets and greater investment. Promoting property rights and anti-corruption measures ought to be high on our foreign policy agenda as well. And virtually every region of the world offers opportunities for the United States to enter new free trade agreements. New initiatives such as the proposed nine-country Trans-Pacific Partnership could create new economic opportunities by expanding trade between the United States, Asia and Latin America. The prescription for solving America's ills requires a double dose of national security and economic freedom. That's what's needed to make "peace through strength" a reality, rather than a bumper sticker.

#### US trade leadership solves nuclear conflict

Panitchpakdi 4 (DG Supachai, Former Director-General – World Trade Organization, “American Leadership and the World Trade Organization: What is the Alternative?”, National Press Club, 2-26, http://www.wto.org/french/ news\_f/spsp\_f/spsp22\_f.htm)

I can sum up my message today in three sentences: The United States, more than any single country, created the world trading system. The US has never had more riding on the strength of that system. And US leadership — especially in the current Doha trade talks — is indispensable to the system's success. It is true that as the WTO's importance to the world economy increases, so too does the challenge of making it work: there are more countries, more issues, trade is in the spot light as never before. But the fiction that there is an alternative to the WTO — or to US leadership — is both naïve and dangerous. Naïve because it fails to recognize that multilateralism has become more — not less — important to advancing US interests. Dangerous because it risks undermining the very objectives the US seeks — freer trade, stronger rules, a more open and secure world economy. The Doha Round is a crucial test. The core issues — services, agriculture, and industrial tariffs — are obviously directly relevant to the US. America is highly competitive in services — the fastest growing sector of the world economy, and where the scope for liberalization is greatest. In agriculture too the US is competitive across many commodities — but sky-high global barriers and subsidies impede and distort agricultural trade. Industrial tariffs also offer scope for further liberalization — especially in certain markets and sectors. But what is at stake in these talks is more than the economic benefits that would flow from a successful deal. The real issue is the relevance of the multilateral trading system. Its expanded rules, broader membership, and binding dispute mechanism means that the new WTO — created less than ten years ago — is pivotal to international economic relations. But this means that the costs of failure are also higher — with ramifications that can be felt more widely. Advancing the Doha agenda would confirm the WTO as the focal point for global trade negotiations, and as the key forum for international economic cooperation. The credibility of the institution would be greatly enhanced. But if the Doha negotiations stumble, doubts may grow, not just about the WTO's effectiveness, but about the future of multilateralism in trade. This should be a major concern to the US for two reasons: First, the US is now integrated with the world economy as never before. A quarter of US GDP is tied to international trade, up from 10 per cent in 1970 — the largest such increase of any developed economy over this period. A third of US growth since 1990 has been generated by trade. And America's trade is increasingly global in scope — 37 per cent with Canada and Mexico, 23 per cent with Europe, 27 per cent with Asia. Last year alone, exports to China rose by almost 30 per cent. The US has also grown more reliant on the rules of the multilateral system to keep world markets open. Not only has it initiated more WTO dispute proceedings than any other country — some 75 since 1995 — according to USTR it has also won or successfully settled most of the cases it has brought. The point is this: even the US cannot achieve prosperity on its own; it is increasingly dependent on international trade, and the rules-based economic order that underpins it. As the biggest economy, largest trader and one of the most open markets in the world, it is axiomatic that the US has the greatest interest in widening and deepening the multilateral system. Furthermore, expanding international trade through the WTO generates increased global prosperity, in turn creating yet more opportunities for the US economy. The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has as the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with — everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic growth tied to exports; the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it’s worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn’t fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector trade — combined with the high skills of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way. They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO? Some argue that the world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute. There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict. America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world trade”. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable. Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO — would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules. All of these were America’s objectives. The US needs to be both clearer about the magnitude of what it has achieved, and more realistic about what it is trying to — and can — accomplish. Multilateralism can be slow, messy, and tortuous. But it is also indispensable to managing an increasingly integrated global economy. Multilateralism is based on the belief that all countries — even powerful countries like the United States — are made stronger and more secure through international co-operation and rules, and by working to strengthen one another from within a system, not outside of it. Multilateralism's greatest ideal is the ideal of negotiation, compromise, consensus, not coercion. As Churchill said of democracy, it is the worst possible system except for all the others. I do not believe America's long-term economic interests have changed. Nor do I believe that America's vision for a just international order has become blurred. If anything, the American vision has been sharpened since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington; sharpened by the realization that there is now a new struggle globally between the forces of openness and modernity, and the forces of separatism and reaction. More than ever, America's interests lie in an open world economy resting on the foundation of a strong, rules-based multilateral system. More and more, America's growth and security are tied to the growth and security of the world economy as a whole. American leadership today is more — not less — important to our increasingly interconnected planet. A recent successful, and much needed, example is the multilateral agreement on intellectual property rights and access to medicines for poor countries, in which the US played a pivotal role. It would be a tragic mistake if the Doha Round, which offers the world a once-in-a-generation opportunity to eliminate trade distortions, to strengthen trade rules, and open markets across the world, were allowed to founder. We need courage and the collective political will to ensure a balanced and equitable outcome. What is the alternative? It is a fragmented world, with greater conflict and uncertainty. A world of the past, not the future — one that America turned away from after 1945, and that we should reject just as decisively today. America must lead. The multilateral trading system is too important to fail. The world depends on it. So does America.

#### Free trade creates disincentives for war – studies prove

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Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real job at an export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.

#### Free trade is key to solve disease

Indur M. Goklany, an independent scholar and the author ofThe Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment August 22, 2002, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa447.pdf

Are the trends in the various measures of human well-being improving as globalization marches on? Have gaps in these measures between the rich and the poor countries widened and, if they have, is globalization responsible? Figure 1, based on cross-country data, shows that various indicators of human wellbeing improve as countries become wealthier, with improvements coming most rapidly at the lowest levels of wealth. There are several possible explanations for this association. First, economic development indeed improves these indicators. Greater wealth translates into greater resources for researching and developing new technologies that directly or indirectly advance human well-being.19 It also means increased resources for advancing literacy and education, which, too, are generally conducive to greater technological innovation and diffusion. 20 Equally important, wealthier societies are better able to afford new as well as existing, but underused, technologies.21 For instance, with respect to health—captured in Figure 1 by both infant mortality and life expectancy— these include “old” technologies such as water treatment to produce safe water, sanitation, basic hygiene, vaccinations, antibiotics, insect and vector control, and pasteurization,22 as well as newer science-based technologies such as AIDS and oral rehydration therapies, organ transplants, mammograms, and other diagnostic tests. They also include agricultural technologies that increase crop yields, thereby increasing available food supplies and reducing hunger and malnourishment, which then reduces the toll of infectious and parasitic diseases. 23 4 Historically, reducing hunger and undernourishment has been among the first practical steps nations have taken to improve public health. That step has reduced infant mortality and increased life expectancy.24 And if despite increased food production a country is still short of food, greater wealth makes it possible, through trade, to purchase food security.25 Greater wealth also makes it more likely that a society will establish and sustain food programs for those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder.26 Therefore, while “you can’t eat GDP,”27 the larger GDP is, the less likely you are to go hungry or be undernourished. As Figure 1 illustrates, greater wealth, through a multiplicity of mechanisms—higher literacy, greater food supplies, and greater access to safe water— leads to better health.28 effect, devoting what once was literally a lifetime to learning their trade. And having acquired expertise, those doctors and researchers are poised to contribute to technological innovation and diffusion in their chosen fields and to guide others along the same path. Thus better health helps raise human capital, which aids the creation and diffusion of technology and thereby further advances health and accelerates economic growth. Both wealth’s and health’s causes and effects probably reinforce each other in a set of interlinked cycles. One such cycle is the health-wealth cycle in which—as we have seen—wealth begets health and health, wealth. Another cycle consists of food production, food access, education, and human capital, which also helps turn the health wealth.

#### The impact is extinction

Darling 12 [Astrobiologist Dirk Schulze-Makuch and British astronomer David Darling Seattle's Big Blog, <http://blog.seattlepi.com/thebigblog/2012/03/18/9-strange-ways-the-world-really-might-end/?fb_xd_fragment>, Washington State University]

Catastrophometer Scale 7.5: The enemy within (Pandemics) Our body is in constant competition with a dizzying array of viruses, bacteria, and parasites, many of which treat us simply as a source of food or a vehicle for reproduction. What’s troubling is that these microbes can mutate and evolve at fantastic speed – the more so thanks to the burgeoning humyn population – confronting our bodies with new dangers every year. HIV, Ebola, bird flu, and antibiotic-resistant “super bugs” are just a few of the pathogenic threats to humynity that have surfaced over the past few decades. Our soaring numbers, ubiquitous international travel, and the increasing use of chemicals and biological agents without full knowledge of their consequences, have increased the risk of unstoppable pandemics arising from mutant viruses and their ilk. Bubonic plague, the Black Death, and the Spanish Flu are vivid examples from history of how microbial agents can decimate populations. But the consequences aren’t limited to a high body count. When the death toll gets high enough, it can disrupt the very fabric of society. According to U.S. government studies, if a global pandemic affecting at least half the world’s population were to strike today, health professionals wouldn’t be able to cope with the vast numbers of sick and succumbing people. The result of so many deaths would have serious implications for the infrastructure, food supply, and security of 21st century man. While an untreatable pandemic could strike suddenly and potentially bring civilization to its knees in weeks or months, degenerative diseases might do so over longer periods. The most common degenerative disease is cancer. Every second men and every third women in the western world will be diagnosed with this disease in their lifetime. Degeneration of our environment through the release of toxins and wastes, air pollution, and intake of unhealthy foods is making this problem worse. If cancer, or some other form of degenerative disease, were to become even more commonplace and strike before reproduction, or become infectious (as seen in the transmitted facial cancer of the Tasmanian Devil, a carnivorous marsupial in Australia) the very survival of our species could be threatened.

## 1AC – Hegemony

#### Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

#### The plan solves 2 internal links

#### 1) Growing a strong US-Mexican relationship

Pastor 2012 Robert A. Pastor is professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor served as National Security Advisor on Latin America during the Carter Administration. “Beyond the Continental Divide” From the July/August 2012 issue of The American Interest http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269

Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports. Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

#### Mexico relations – it’s a key pillar for U.S. hegemony

Smith 13 Simon Bolivar Professor of Latin American Studies at University of California in San Diego.[1] He has been president of the Latin American Studies Association since 1989, Ph.D. in Comparative Politics, Latin America from Columbia University “Global Scenarios and Bilateral Priorities” Mexico and the United States : the politics of partnership I Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, editors. P. 19-20

A more nuanced interpretation of unipolarity emerges from the recent work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a widely respected academic and former national security adviser. Despite a visible shift of power from the West toward the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Brzezinski asserts that "America's role in the world will continue to be essential in the years to come. Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism." "America is still peerless," he says, although it must rise to meet a range of challenges. domestic and international. Like Kagan, he concludes that it is a matter of national will: "The key to America's future is thus in the hands of the American people."12 In contrast to Kagan and others, Brzezinski stresses the importance of geographic location as a major asset for the United States. By this he means not only its "splendid isolation" from turbulence on other continents, but also the presence of a "good neighborhood"-marked by peaceful and cooperative relations with Canada and Mexico. Tranquility within the neighborhood thus enables the United States to project and sustain its power in other parts of the world.1.'.I This insight provokes an extended meditation by Brzezinski on US relations with Mexico. With evident concern, he focuses on the likely consequences for Mexico of a serious decline in US power: A waning partnership between America and Mexico could precipitate regional and even international realignments. A reduction in Mexico's democratic values, its economic power, and its political stability coupled with the dangers of drug cartel expansion would limit Mexico's ability to become a regional leader with a productive and positive agenda. This, in the end, could be the ultimate impact of American decline: a weaker. less stable. less economically viable and more anti-American Mexico unable to constructively compete with Brazil for cooperative regional leadership or to help promote stability in Central America. 14 Alternatively, one might have speculated on reverse cause and effect: the impact on the United States of Mexican decline, especially a descent into state failure. Even so, Brzezinski makes a fundamental point: Mexico provides a significant pillar for US power and it therefore deserves concomitant attention from policymakers.

#### 2) Energy power

Gjelten 12 (Tom, Diplomatic Correspondent – NPR, “The Dash for Gas: The Golden Age of an Energy Game-Changer,” World Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/dash-gas-golden-age-energy-game-changer)

For a fresh perspective on geopolitical trends, look at the world through the lens of the natural gas trade. One of the reasons for Israeli unease with the Arab Spring is that the democratic uprising that took down Hosni Mubarak also brought interruptions in Israel’s supply of natural gas, much of which since 2008 has come from Egypt. Wondering about China’s new interest in Australia and Qatar? It’s about their abundant gas supplies and China’s tremendous energy needs. Desperate for signs of cooperation from North Korea? Check out reports that Kim Jong-il may agree to the construction of a natural gas pipeline that would link Russia, Pyongyang, and Seoul. From Asia to the Middle East to North America, a boom in natural gas usage is rearranging international connections, with major repercussions for global politics. Energy consumers see that natural gas is relatively inexpensive, provided it can be transported efficiently, and abundant, especially if it can be harvested from shale rock and other unconventional deposits. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that over the next twenty-five years gas will be the fastest-growing energy source, overtaking coal as soon as 2030. Around the world, natural gas is fast becoming the fuel of choice for electric power generation, especially with nuclear losing its appeal in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Energy experts predict gas could even displace oil in the transportation sector, as car and truck engines are redesigned. The trend has so impressed IEA analysts that the agency in 2011 boldly predicted that the world is entering “a golden age of gas.” The implications are significant. Because gas is somewhat cleaner than other fossil fuels, its rise as a fuel source should have environmental benefits. Because it is cheaper than oil, its increased use would lower energy costs and bring energy to millions of people who lack access to it now. But among the most striking consequences of a dramatic growth in natural gas consumption would be its effect on international relations. The energy trade is an important determinant of the global balance of power, and the shift to natural gas will introduce a new set of winners and losers, bringing greater independence to many countries and reducing the energy leverage that oil producers have traditionally enjoyed. After chairing an advisory panel on the subject for the Department of Energy, former CIA director John Deutch concluded that the prospective geopolitical shifts amount to no less than “a natural gas revolution” in global affairs. A big difference between gas and oil is the trading infrastructure. While oil can be shipped in tankers, gas has moved mainly through pipelines, thus confining it largely to regional markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is facilitating the development of a global market in gas, but it is still traded largely on a country-to-country basis, with negotiated prices that are specified in contracts. As gas usage has grown, these gas deals have grown more important. In Bolivia, for instance, a determination to use natural gas wealth for political ends has affected relations with its neighbors for most of the past decade. Privately financed exploration in the late 1990s revealed that the country’s proven gas reserves were six times greater than what was previously believed, but Bolivian leaders could not agree on how to exploit them. A public outcry forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign and leave the country in 2003 after he proposed to export natural gas to Mexico and the United States through a terminal in Chile, where it was to have been liquefied. (Anti-Chilean sentiment has run deep in Bolivia ever since a war with Chile in 1879 cost the country its Pacific access.) Bolivian gas is now sold instead to Brazil and Argentina, but disputes with Brazil over the terms of the gas contract have cast a shadow over that relationship in recent years, and management of the country’s gas exports is probably Bolivia’s top foreign-policy challenge. The Bolivian case shows how the natural gas trade is more likely to be complicated by resource nationalism than the oil business would be. In a pique, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez can say he is prepared to cut off oil sales to the United States, but because oil is a globally traded commodity managed by middlemen, the threat is largely meaningless. For every buyer, there will always be a seller. State-to-state gas deals, by contrast, are more likely to carry geopolitical overtones. In 2005, for example, Egypt took the bold step of agreeing to sell natural gas to Israel. The gas began flowing in 2008 through a pipeline that runs across the Sinai peninsula and continues undersea to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Israel depends on natural gas for much of its power generation, and the deal with Egypt has provided the country with more than forty percent of its gas needs. The notion of exporting gas to Israel has been highly unpopular in Egypt, however, and in the months following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the Sinai pipeline has been repeatedly blown up, forcing Israel to fire up unused coal plants and convert several gas-fueled generating stations to run on fuel oil or diesel instead, at a cost of several million dollars. But the country had a possible solution: In December 2010, a Houston-based energy exploration company announced “a significant natural gas discovery” about eighty miles off Israel’s coast. Preliminary measurements suggested it could be the world’s biggest deepwater gas discovery in ten years and could provide Israel with enough gas to become a net exporter, providing it with more clout in its regional energy relationships. South Korea also relies on imported energy sources and is keen on natural gas, which explains its interest in a Russian proposal to build a pipeline that would carry Russian gas from Siberia across the Korean peninsula. The idea has been floated for years, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently gave the proposal his firm support during a meeting in August 2011 with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak subsequently agreed to work closely with the Russians to make the project a reality. The South Koreans have offered to build a natural gas power generating plant in the north as compensation for Pyongyang’s support for the pipeline. The key to the project’s success would be a design that would reassure Seoul that the North Korean authorities had no incentive to steal the gas or cut off the supply before it reaches the south. The textbook illustration of a link between geopolitics and the natural gas trade is Russia. As of 2010, the country was the world’s top gas producer (after briefly being surpassed by the United States), with one state-controlled company, Gazprom, accounting for about eighty percent of the country’s production. Originally part of the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Gas Industry, Gazprom is in effect a state monopoly, and its power and reach are without comparison in the energy world. The company has its own armed forces, with as many as twenty thousand armed security guards and a private fleet of unmanned drones, used mainly to monitor pipelines and production facilities. The company effectively operates as an arm of the Russian state, and the company’s gas deals in Europe and Asia can legitimately be seen as an extension of Russian foreign policy, exemplifying the growing importance of “gas diplomacy.” Though its relative importance as a gas provider to Europe has diminished over the past ten years, Russia still meets about a quarter of Europe’s needs, more than any other supplier, and European governments have long been uneasy about their dependence on Russian gas. About eighty percent of the Russian gas shipment to Europe goes through Ukraine, and the flow has been cut on two major occasions at least in part because of geopolitical wrangling. In January 2006, after Kiev resisted price increase demands, Gazprom reduced the flow of gas to Ukraine, causing shortages in other European countries that received gas through Ukraine. Politics seems to have played a role in the Russian move. Ukraine at the time was moving closer to the West, and Ukrainian leaders charged that Moscow, with its price increase demands, was trying to “blackmail” Ukraine into changing its political course. The gas flow was cut once again in January 2009, causing a severe midwinter gas shortage across Europe. The two episodes convinced many European leaders that Russia was ready and willing to use Gazprom’s clout in what it considered its “privileged sphere of influence,” with the goal of bringing the former Soviet republics back under Moscow’s control. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, spoke for many European observers when he wrote in 2010, “The primary goal of Russian gas policy isn’t economic but political, namely to further the aim of revising the post-Soviet order in Europe.” The eagerness of European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian gas has prompted ongoing efforts to find alternative supply routes. Iraq and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are promising sources, and for about a decade European authorities have been scheming to develop a gas pipeline that would bypass Russia. The Nabucco pipeline project, launched in 2002, would bring gas from the Caspian basin across Turkey to a hub in Austria. In addition, BP and two Italian companies have been promoting pipeline projects of their own along that southern corridor. The European Commission and the United States have both given strong backing to the Nabucco project, but the pipeline planners have had a difficult time lining up the supply commitments needed to make the project economically worthwhile. Moscow has put pressure on the Central Asian states to send their gas to Russia rather than Europe, and China is pursuing supply deals of its own in the region. Among the major new developments has been the construction of new facilities to liquefy natural gas. Petroleum engineers have long known how to convert gas into liquid form through extreme cooling, but only in recent years has the LNG industry expanded to the point that it has altered gas trading patterns. The construction of dozens of new liquefaction and regasification plants around the world, along with the introduction of LNG tanker ships, has made it possible for island nations like Australia to become major gas exporters, and it has given gas-consuming countries new supply sources. The United States, Japan, China, and European countries were all quick to embrace the industry. (In the US alone, twelve new terminals have been built to receive LNG, with plants to regasify the LNG for shipment through pipelines around the country.) The development has been rapid. The International Energy Agency predicts that between 2008 and 2020 total liquefaction capacity will double. Qatar, which opened its first LNG plant in 1997, by 2006 had become the world’s top LNG producer and was investing in LNG terminals around the world. For European countries with terminals, importing LNG from Qatar or Algeria or Nigeria is another way to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. By 2035, for example, LNG is expected to supply about half of the United Kingdom’s natural gas needs, with imports from Qatar leading the way. British Prime Minister David Cameron’s February 2011 visit to Qatar, culminating in a new gas deal, put Moscow on notice that Europe had alternatives to Russian gas. Qatar and other LNG exporters have an even more inviting market in Asia. The IEA foresees China’s gas consumption growing by nearly six percent annually up to 2035. Japan, having lost much of its nuclear generating capacity as a result of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, is now a huge gas market as well, and LNG imports from Australia, Qatar, and the other gas exporting countries will be essential to its energy mix. Such developments were not foreseen twenty years ago. The LNG industry has diversified the gas trade, introducing new producers into the picture and giving gas importers more supply choices just as their demand for gas is growing. Without a doubt, the most revolutionary recent development in the natural gas world has been an improvement in the ability to extract gas from shale rock and other unconventional sources. Geologists have known for two hundred years that shale contains combustible gas, but the tightness of the shale formation meant that the gas was generally considered unrecoverable. In the last decade, however, energy companies in the United States have found that it is economically possible to harvest shale gas through the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), by which large amounts of water mixed with sand and chemicals are injected at high pressure into the rock formations in order to free the gas trapped inside. In addition, gas producers are now employing horizontal drilling techniques, turning their drill bits in a horizontal direction after reaching a deep shale reservoir and thus reaching more deposits from a single well. These developments have proven so promising that analysts are dramatically increasing their estimates of how much shale gas can be recovered around the world. In the United States, shale accounted for almost no gas production as recently as 2000. It now provides about twenty percent of the total production, and within twenty years it could be half. The US government’s Energy Information Administration has estimated that if recoverable shale gas reserves are included, the United States may have enough natural gas to meet US needs for the next hundred years, at current consumption rates. Such estimates are imprecise and may well be adjusted downward, but the production of shale gas has already dramatically altered the US energy picture. Just a few years ago, it was assumed that the United States would be a net importer of natural gas, with much of it arriving as LNG. But the terminals and regasification facilities that were built to facilitate LNG imports are now going largely unused. The successful production of shale gas could even mean the United States will soon be a net gas exporter. Some of the existing regasification facilities, built for LNG imports, could actually be converted to liquefaction plants, so that excess domestic gas production can be exported as LNG. If the United States became self-sufficient in natural gas, there would be significant geopolitical implications. When Arab states in 1973 imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States as punishment for US support of Israel, American consumers learned how vulnerable their country was to the “oil weapon” when used by potentially hostile states. As the United States moves toward energy independence, if only in gas, that vulnerability disappears. There would also be geopolitical effects overseas. With the United States no longer importing LNG, that gas could go to European consumers instead, and Europe’s dependence on Russia for its gas supply would diminish. In 2000, Russia was supplying about forty percent of Europe’s gas; some estimates have the Russian share sliding to ten percent by 2040. Whether the United States can maintain a sharply upward trend in shale gas production depends on whether the reserves are as promising as they now appear to be, whether the gas price is sufficient to cover production costs, and especially whether environmental concerns associated with shale drilling are addressed. Hydraulic fracturing requires enormous amounts of water, and recycling or disposal of the waste water can be problematic. There have been cases where shale well casings have proved defective, and contamination of the surrounding soil or water has occurred. Authorities in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland have imposed temporary moratoria on fracking in order to assess the practice and determine whether it imposes any risks to drinking water or human health.

#### Energy power solves nuclear conflict

Hagel 12 [Chuck Hagel, Professor at Georgetown University, “The Challenge of Change”, 5/15/12, <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/challenge-change>]

A new world order is being built today by seven billion global citizens. America’s responsibilities in this new world and to future generations are as enormous as they are humbling. The challenges and choices before us demand leadership that reaches into the future without stumbling over today. They also require challenging every past frame of reference. Sensing the realities and subtleties of historic change are not always sudden or obvious. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recounted, “Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the 19th century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.” Staying a step ahead of the forces of change requires an ability to foresee and appreciate the consequences of our actions, a willingness to learn the hard lessons of history and from our own experiences, and a clear realization of the limitations of great power. Acheson and the Wise Men of that time got it right. America led the shaping of the post-Second World War world order through strong inspired leadership, a judicious (most of the time) use of its power, and working with allies through alliances and institutions. This has helped prevent a Third World War and a nuclear (WAR) holocaust. The world we face in 2012 is of a different character than even a few years ago. Many developing nations are fragile states and are under enormous pressure from terrorism, endemic poverty, environmental challenges, debt, corruption, civil unrest, and regional, tribal, and religious conflicts. The result is a climate of despair, and potential breeding grounds for radical politics and extremism. A successful American foreign policy must include thinking through actions and policies, and how uncontrollable and unpredictable global forces may affect outcomes. Eleven years of invasions and occupations have put the U.S. in a deep hole and mired us down in terribly costly commitments in blood, treasure, and prestige. Our diplomatic and security flexibility has been seriously eroded by many of the decisions of the last eleven years. Too often we tend to confuse tactical action for strategic thinking. A matter of mutual understanding American foreign policy has always required a principled realism that is true to our values as we face the world as it really is in all of its complexities. We need to accept the reality that there is not a short-term solution to every problem in the world. What we must do is manage these realities and complex problems, moving them into positions of solution possibilities and resolution. American foreign policy has always dared to project a vision of a world where all things are possible. If we are to succeed, we must understand how the world sees us. Turn on our receivers more often and shut off our transmitters. This is a vital priority for a successful 21st century foreign policy. We must also avoid the traps of hubris, ideology and insularity, and know that there is little margin for error with the stakes so high in the world today. America must strengthen its global alliances. Common-interest alliances will be required in a volatile world of historic diffusions of power. The great challenges facing the world today are the responsibility of all peoples of the world. They include cyber warfare, terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, prosperity and stability, and global poverty, disease and environmental degradation. Our allies throughout the world share these same challenges and threats and will also be just as affected by the outcomes. These will be either our common successes or our common failures. America cannot be successful with any of these challenges, without sustained partnerships and deep cooperation in the economic, intelligence, diplomatic, humanitarian, military and law enforcement fields. The centrality of alliances and multi-lateral institutions to a successful foreign policy is fundamental. Alliances and multi-lateral institutions must be understood as expansions of our influence, not as constraints on our power. Alliances are imperfect, as are all institutions. But like “process,” they help absorb shocks. Beyond military solutions Alliances must be built on solid foundations to handle both routine and sudden unforeseen challenges. Crisis-driven “coalitions of the willing” by themselves are not the building blocks for a stable world. We need to think more broadly, deeply and strategically. American military power and force structure cannot sustain its commitments without a shift to a more comprehensive strategic approach to global threats and a more flexible and agile military. Cyber warfare is a paramount example of these new threats. The perception of American power around the world must not rest solely on a military orientation or optic. There must be an underlying commitment to engagement and humanity. Engagement is not appeasement, nor is it negotiation. It is not a guarantee of anything, but rather a smart diplomatic bridge to better understanding and possible conflict resolution. American foreign policy must reflect the realities and demands of the global economy. The global economy cannot be shut out of foreign policy. There can be no higher priority for America than to remain economically competitive in a world undergoing a historic diffusion of economic power. A nation’s strength is anchored to and underpinned by its economic strength. The connections between America’s trade, economic, and energy policies must also be synthesized into a strategic vision for American foreign policy that not only meets the challenges of our time, but frames the completeness of long-term policies for strategic future outcomes. Trade is a major catalyst for economic strength and growth at home and abroad, as well as a critical stabilizer for world peace and prosperity. America must remain the global champion of free, fair and open trade. As the world’s strongest, largest and most dynamic economy, America must continue to lead world trade. Economic strength must be as high a priority as any other foreign policy priority. America’s security and growth are connected to both the American and global economies. A centerpiece of this security is energy security. Energy security and energy interdependence are interconnected parts of a broad and deep foreign policy paradigm that frames the complexity of the challenges that face America and the world. A diverse portfolio of energy that is accessible and affordable is the core of America’s energy security. Much of the world’s energy is produced in countries and regions that are consumed by civil unrest, lack of human rights, corruption, underdevelopment, and conflict. The price of oil is driven by supply and demand and the global market. We must ensure diversification of sources of supply and distribution networks to prevent undue dependence on any one country or region. Instability and violence disrupt supply and distribution and increase prices.

#### Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

#### AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

#### US power is the most peaceful

Busby, 12 [Get Real Chicago IR guys out in force, Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>]

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all" \t "_new) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity **compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other [reports](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) based on Uppsala data is right**,** war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

## 2AC Round 3

## 2AC – Kritik

### 2AC – Coloniality

#### The Judge is a policymaker tasked with evaluating cost benefit policy analysis - prevents unpredictable frameworks that divert topic focus and moot 1AC time

#### Perm do both – alt cedes politics

Walt 11 (Stephen M, Professor at the University of Chicago, October 19, “Lessons for the social sciences” , [http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/19/lessons\_for\_the\_social\_sciences](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/19/lessons_for_the_social_sciences%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

Needless to say, I like this argument because I believe it is important for the social sciences to be a diverse intellectual ecosystem instead of a monoculture where one approach or method reigns supreme. Even if one approach or theoretical model were demonstrably superior -- and that is rarely, if ever, the case -- there would still be considerable value in having lots of other scholars working in different ways. Sometimes we learn by exploring deductions in a formal model (though we often just restate the obvious when we do); at other times we learn by "soaking and poking" among policymakers, by constructing a data set and exploring patterns within it, or by immersing ourselves in the details of historical cases or by exploring the categories of thought and discourse that surround a given policy domain. Given that all these approaches yield useful knowledge, why would any serious department want to privilege one approach over all others? But because academic disciplines are largely self-defining and self-policing (i.e., we determine the "criteria of merit" and success depends almost entirely on one's reputation among fellow academics), there is the ever-present danger that academic disciplines spin off into solipsistic and self-regarding theorizing that is divorced from the real world (and therefore unlikely to be refuted by events) and of little value to our students, to policymakers, or even interested citizens. This tendency occurs primarily because proponents of one approach naturally tend to think that their way of doing business is superior, and some of them work overtime to promote people who look like them and to exclude people whose work is different. Anybody who has spent a few years in a contemporary political science department cannot fail to have observed this phenomenon at work; there just aren't very many people who are genuinely catholic in their tastes and willing to embrace work that isn't pretty much like their own. This situation creates a real dilemma: if you believe in academic freedom (and I do), then you don't want outside authorities interfering in the production of knowledge, telling academics how to do their work, or setting stupid criteria for evaluating scholarly contributions. But without some pressure to be at least potentially relevant, the social sciences are prone to drift off into what Hans Morgenthau once decried as "the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical -- in short, the politically irrelevant." I've already touted my own prescriptions for this problem here, but I don't have enormous confidence that any of them will be heeded. But at the risk of seeming to tout my own employer (and similar programs elsewhere), that's why I increasingly expect the most interesting and relevant work to emerge from schools of public policy, and not from the increasingly arcane worlds of traditional disciplinary departments.

#### The only moral obligation is to prevent extinction – case outweighs

Bauman 95 Zygmunt Bauman, University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71

The being‑for is like living towards‑the‑future: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other,as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching‑toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not‑yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an‑other Other, that life can be lived ‑ not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all‑too‑familiar unsure‑of‑itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' ‑ both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being‑for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self‑defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being‑for‑the‑Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view ‑ makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place ‑ but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being‑for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery ‑ noted Max Frisch ‑ (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed ‑ soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to the musical‑chairs game of the real and the potential ‑ it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of being‑for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition ‑ an end to itself. Without knowing ‑ without being capable of knowing ‑ that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness ( the being‑for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre‑empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. The togetherness of being‑for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being‑for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. This is the tragedy of being‑for ‑ the reason why it cannot but be death‑bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not‑yet. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being‑with) that we turn into moral selves. And it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally, and sometimes even of being good, in the present.

#### And our rhetoric of Latin America isn’t bad—rather it’s a way to mobilize action from the government to pass TBA—that’s key to solve all our advantages

#### No root cause – prefer specifics

Moore, 04 [John Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia He formerly served as the first Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, Winter, “Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle”, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis Law]

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. [n158](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1329520437445&returnToKey=20_T13973620735&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.647208.6119287203#n158) Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come.

#### View their evidence through a lens of skepticism—none of it is about Latin America—and all of their authors choose to ignore when American influence has helped Latin America

#### Our epistemology is accurate and shouldn’t be prioritized

Wendt 98 (professor of international security – Ohio State University, Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The central point of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion (after all, after 2000 years, even the specialists are still having a hard time). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, not second-order issues of method.

Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contaminated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘paradigm wars’. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures of science.

#### Even if the aff is colonial it doesn’t whole sale disprove that the plan is a good idea – hold them to a high threshold to disprove our entire aff—it can still be a good idea for multiple reasons

#### No impact and no alternative solvency

Grossberg 10(Distinguished Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies, and Adjunct Distinguished Professor of American Studies, Anthropology, and Geography at the University of North Carolina Lawrence, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, pg. 264)

However, there are ambivalences within the project. First, the M/C group is attempting to decenter modernity from its apparent European origins, proposing instead to adopt "a world perspective in the explanation of modernity, in lieu of a view of modernity as an intra-European phenomenon" (Escobar 2007, r84). Yet they continue to identify modernity with Europe, even as they double it: the first modernity begins in 1492 with the Spanish colonization of the Americas, followed by a second (n1ore con1monly rec- ognized) modernity of northern Europe, which did not replace the former but "overlaps” with it. They limit modernity to Europe, but suggest it is the product of global relations; yet it is unclear why all modernity is euro-modernity, and therefore inescapably involved in coloniality. Could one imagine a modernity without coloniality? If such imagination is not possible, then how is it possible to imagine other elements that are similarly intimately connected to modernity but without the contamination of euro-modernity? For exrunple, if it is necessary to give up any notion of moder-nity, why are we not compelled to give up notions of democracy? VVhy can democracy be reconceived but modernity cannot?

#### No link—Mexico has already said yes to the bill—if their kritik is true than it should already be in action in the status quo

#### Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley 10 (visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. But even if you break down the world into bits, it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, the outcome for the world is remarkably, astonishingly, dramatically positive. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. Despite a doubling of the world population, even the raw number of people living in absolute poverty (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) has fallen **since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

## 2AC –CP

### 2AC – CP

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the counterplan

#### No solve aff

#### TI prevents solvency

Ebinger et al. 12 (Charles, Task Force Co-Chair of Brookings Institution Natural Gas Task Force, "Evaluating the Prospects for Increased Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas from the United States", January,Brookings,www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/natural%20gas%20ebinger/natural\_gas\_ebinger\_2.pdf)

Shipping Capacity The successful export of LNG will depend upon the necessary shipping infrastructure and capacity being in place. Cheniere Energy is looking to export up to 2.2 bcf/day of gas from its Sabine Pass LNG terminal in Louisiana. 39 Depending on the size of the LNG vessel, this would require between three and five supertankers per week. In order to accommodate this volume of large ships, some domestic U.S. ports will require additional dredging. Other shipping-related concerns include security of vessels and the adequacy of Coast Guard capacity to provide that security (exporters must meet Coast Guard Waterway Suitability, Security, and Emergency standards prior to approval); and the capacity of sea lanes, particularly to Asia. Increasing shipments to Asia will depend on the capacity of the Panama Canal, which is currently too small to accommodate most LNG tankers. However, after the planned expansion of the canal is completed—expected to be in 2014—roughly 80 percent of the world’s LNG tankers will be able to pass through the isthmus, resulting in a dramatic decline in shipping costs to Asia. 40

#### No barriers to LNG exports besides the TI

Ebinger et al. 12 (Charles, Task Force Co-Chair of Brookings Institution Natural Gas Task Force, "Evaluating the Prospects for Increased Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas from the United States", January,Brookings,www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/natural%20gas%20ebinger/natural\_gas\_ebinger\_2.pdf)

We will discuss more about the global LNG market in the implications section. However, I will mention three major factors that have a significant bearing on the United States's ability to export LNG. The first is the widening of the Panama Canal, expected to be completed in 2014. Currently, very few LNG tankers can traverse the isthmus. After its widening, however, it is estimated that 80 percent of the world's LNG tankers will be able to pass through. This will make Gulf Coast LNG exports to Asia instantly more economical. The second is the impact of various national nuclear energy policies on gas demand. Germany's decision to accelerate the phase-out of its nuclear power plants will significantly increase the demand for natural gas. A similar decision by Japan, where the public is clearly wary of nuclear energy in the wake of the Fukushima accident, has led to a significant boost to the country's gas demand for LNG. Finally, the spread of the unconventional gas revolution potentially to new markets such as China, India, Ukraine and Poland could change the fortunes of the LNG market if these countries develop what some people believe are very, very high shale gas reserves. While technical and regulatory obstacles may delay the prospect for rapid shale development in the near term, it may place demand for LNG in the decades to come. And this is a very difficult fact when you consider that when you sign one of these contracts to export LNG to your buyers you have to make assumptions about what your competitive position is for 25 years down the road. Taking into account the various factors that have an impact on the feasibility of natural gas exports, the study concludes that based on our existing knowledge, and the existing and proposed policy and regulatory landscape, exports are technically and logistically feasible. In other words, there are no insurmountable barriers to the U.S. going ahead with exports of LNG. And it is important to note that while we highlight some of the issues that are likely to affect the economics of LNG exports, such as securing financing and the fixed costs of liquefaction and transportation, it was not our study's objective to come to a conclusion on the economic feasibility of exports for those companies considering doing so. Rather, we believe that the market will determine which of the proposed projects move ahead or don't.

## 2AC – Politics

### 2AC – Debt Ceiling

#### Debt won’t pass – Boehner

Mattingly 10/7 (Phil Mattingly, Head writer for Bloomberg News Corp., “Boehner Says House Won’t Vote on Clean Debt Limit Bill”, 10/7/13, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-06/boehner-says-house-doesn-t-have-votes-to-raise-debt-limit.html>, zs)

U.S. House Speaker John Boehner said the Republican-controlled chamber can’t pass an increase to the U.S. debt ceiling without packaging it with other provisions -- something President Barack Obama has labeled a nonstarter. “We are not going to pass a clean debt limit,” the Ohio Republican said yesterday in an interview on ABC’s “This Week” program. “The votes are not in the House to pass a clean debt limit.” Boehner said the U.S. might end up in default if Obama doesn’t negotiate. “That’s the path we’re on,” he said. The stalemate between the White House and House Republicans showed little sign of thawing 10 days from when Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew says the U.S. will exhaust measures to avoid breaching the debt ceiling. While Obama will negotiate on budget details or to strengthen the Affordable Care Act, he “is not going to sanction negotiations with any faction that are using the threat of default as a way of extracting policy in our democracy,” Gene Sperling, director of the president’s National Economic Council, said today at a breakfast sponsored by Politico.

#### XO Solves

IHT 10/4 (International Herald Tribune, 10/4/13 edition, “White House has options if impasse arises on debt ceiling,” p. lexis)

As a result, economists and investors have quietly begun to explore the options the White House might have in the event Congress fails to act.

The most widely discussed strategy would be for President Barack Obama to invoke authority under the 14th Amendment and essentially order the federal government to keep borrowing, an option that was endorsed by former President Bill Clinton during an earlier debt standoff in 2011.

And in recent days, prominent Democrats like Senator Max Baucus, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Representative Nancy Pelosi, the House minority leader, have urged the White House to seriously consider such a route, even if it might provoke a threat of impeachment from House Republicans and ultimately require the Supreme Court to rule on its legitimacy.

Other potential October surprises range from the logistically forbidding, like prioritizing payments, issuing i.o.u.'s or selling off gold and other assets, to more fanciful ideas, like minting a trillion-dollar platinum coin.

So far, administration officials have continued to insist that there is no plausible alternative to congressional action on the debt limit.

In December 2012, Jay Carney, the White House spokesman, flatly renounced the 14th Amendment option, saying: ''I can say that this administration does not believe that the 14th Amendment gives the president the power to ignore the debt ceiling - period.'' And on Wednesday, a senior administration lawyer said that remained the administration's view.

Still, some observers outside government in Washington and on Wall Street, citing an approach resembling game theory, suggest that the president's position is more tactical than fundamental, since raising the possibility of a way out for the White House like the constitutional gambit would take the heat off Republicans in Congress to act on their own before the Oct. 17 deadline.

''If a default is imminent, the option of raising the debt limit by executive fiat has to be on the table,'' said Greg Valliere, chief political strategist at Potomac Research. ''Desperate times require desperate measures.''

Some professional investors echoed his view, which is a reason Wall Street remains hopeful that the economic and financial disaster a government default could usher in will be avoided.

''At the end of the day if there is no action and the United States has a default looming, I think President Obama can issue an executive order authorizing the Treasury secretary to make payments,'' said David Kotok, chief investment officer of Cumberland Advisors in Sarasota, Florida, which has just over $2 billion under management. ''There's always been more flexibility in the hands of Treasury than they've acknowledged.''

According to some legal theorists, the president could essentially ignore the debt limit imposed by Congress, because the 14th Amendment states that the ''validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,'' including debts like pensions and bounties to suppress insurrections, ''shall not be questioned.''

#### No impact to debt ceiling

Raum 11 (Tom AP, “Record $14 trillion-plus debt weighs on Congress”, Jan 15, <http://www.mercurynews.com/news/ci_17108333?source=rss&nclick_check=1>)

Democrats have use doomsday rhetoric about a looming government shutdown and comparing the U.S. plight to financial crises in Greece and Portugal. It's all a bit of a stretch. "We can't do as the Gingrich crowd did a few years ago, close the government," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.), referring to government shutdowns in 1995 when Georgia Republican Newt Gingrich was House speaker. But those shutdowns had nothing to do with the debt limit. They were caused by failure of Congress to appropriate funds to keep federal agencies running. And there are many temporary ways around the debt limit. Hitting it does not automatically mean a default on existing debt. It only stops the government from new borrowing, forcing it to rely on other ways to finance its activities. In a 1995 debt-limit crisis, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin borrowed $60 billion from federal pension funds to keep the government going. It wasn't popular, but it helped get the job done. A decade earlier, James Baker, President Ronald Reagan's treasury secretary, delayed payments to the Civil Service and Social Security trust funds and used other bookkeeping tricks to keep money in the federal till. Baker and Rubin "found money in pockets no one knew existed before," said former congressional budget analyst Stanley Collender. Collender, author of "Guide to the Federal Budget," cites a slew of other things the government can do to delay a crisis. They include leasing out government-owned properties, "the federal equivalent of renting out a room in your home," or slowing down payments to government contractors. Now partner-director of Qorvis Communications, a Washington consulting firm, Collender said such stopgap measures buy the White House time to resist GOP pressure for concessions. "My guess is they can go months after the debt ceiling is not raised and still be able to come up with the cash they need. But at some point, it will catch up," and raising the debt limit will become an imperative, he suggested.

### 2AC – Politics

#### US is increasing engagement with Mexico all the time—takes out the disad

#### No link – plan doesn’t require congressional approval

Janofsky 6 (Michael, Veteran Journalist, “Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy

Policy,” New York Times, 4-9, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09drill.html)

A Bush administration proposal to open an energy-rich tract of the Gulf of Mexico to oil and gas drilling has touched off a tough fight in Congress, the latest demonstration of the political barriers to providing new energy supplies even at a time of high demand and record prices. The two-million-acre area, in deep waters 100 miles south of Pensacola, Fla., is estimated to contain nearly half a billion barrels of oil and three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, enough to run roughly a million vehicles and heat more than half a million homes for about 15 years. The site, Area 181, is the only major offshore leasing zone that the administration is offering for development. But lawmakers are divided over competing proposals to expand or to limit the drilling. The Senate Energy Committee and its chairman, Pete V. Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, are pushing for a wider drilling zone, while the two Florida senators and many from the state's delegation in the House are arguing for a smaller tract. Other lawmakers oppose any new drilling at all. The debate could go a long way toward defining how the nation satisfies its need for new energy and whether longstanding prohibitions against drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf, the deep waters well beyond state coastlines, will end. The fight, meanwhile, threatens to hold up the confirmation of President Bush's choice to lead the Interior Department, Gov. Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho. Mr. Kempthorne was nominated last month to replace Gale A. Norton, a proponent of the plan, who stepped down March 31. Like Ms. Norton, Mr. Kempthorne, a former senator, is a determined advocate of developing new supplies of energy through drilling. While environmental groups say that discouraging new drilling would spur development of alternative fuels, administration officials say that timely action in Area 181 and beyond could bring short-term relief to the nation's energy needs and, perhaps, lower fuel costs for consumers. "It's important to have expansions of available acres in the Gulf of Mexico as other areas are being tapped out," Ms. Norton said recently. She predicted that drilling in the offshore zone would lead to further development in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that have been off-limits since the 1980's under a federal moratorium that Congress has renewed each year and that every president since then has supported. States are beginning to challenge the prohibitions. Legislatures in Georgia and Kansas recently passed resolutions urging the government to lift the bans. On Friday, Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, a Democrat, rejected language in a state energy bill that asked Congress to lift the drilling ban off Virginia's coast. But he did not close the door to a federal survey of natural gas deposits. Meanwhile, Representative Richard W. Pombo, Republican of California, the pro-development chairman of the House Resources Committee, plans to introduce a bill in June that would allow states to seek control of any energy exploration within 125 miles of their shorelines. Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, a Republican, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas, a Democrat, introduced a similar bill in the Senate last month. Currently, coastal states can offer drilling rights only in waters within a few miles of their own shores. Mr. Pombo and other lawmakers would also change the royalty distribution formula for drilling in Outer Continental Shelf waters so states would get a share of the royalties that now go entirely to the federal government. Senators from Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi are co-sponsoring a bill that would create a 50-50 split. As exceptions to the federal ban, the western and central waters of the Gulf of Mexico produce nearly a third of the nation's oil and more than a fifth of its natural gas. But Area 181 has been protected because of its proximity to Florida and the opposition of Mr. Bush's brother, Gov. Jeb Bush. By its current boundaries, the pending lease area is a much smaller tract than the 5.9 million acres the Interior Department first considered leasing more than 20 years ago and the 3.6 million acres that the department proposed to lease in 2001. This year, two million acres of the original tract are proposed for lease as the only waters of the Outer Continental Shelf that the administration is making available for 2007-12. The proposal is an administrative action that does not require Congressional approval, but it is still subject to public comment before being made final. Unless Congress directs the administration to change course, the administration's final plan would lead to bidding on new leases in 2007.

#### Winners win and political capital isn’t key

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

#### PC isn’t real

Edwards 9 – Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford [George, “The Strategic President”, Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 149-150]

Even presidents who appeared to dominate Congress were actually facilitators rather than directors of change. They understood their own limitations and explicitly took advantage of opportunities in their environments. Working at the margins, they successfully guided legislation through Congress. When their resources diminished, they reverted to the stalemate that usually characterizes presidential-congressional relations. As legendary management expert Peter Drucker put it about Ronald Reagan, "His great strength was not charisma, as is commonly thought, but his awareness and acceptance of exactly what he could and what he could not do."134 These conclusions are consistent with systematic research by Jon Bond, Richard Fleisher, and B. Dan Wood. They have focused on determining whether the presidents to whom we attribute the greatest skills in dealing with Congress were more successful in obtaining legislative support for their policies than were other presidents. After carefully controlling for other influences on congressional voting, they found no evidence that those presidents who supposedly were the most proficient in persuading Congress were more successful than chief executives with less aptitude at influencing legislators.135 Scholars studying leadership within Congress have reached similar conclusions about the limits on personal leadership. Cooper and Brady found that institutional context is more important than personal leadership skills or traits in determining the influence of leaders and that there is no relationship between leadership style and effectiveness.136 Presidential legislative leadership operates in an environment largely beyond the president's control and must compete with other, more stable factors that affect voting in Congress in addition to party. These include ideology, personal views and commitments on specific policies, and the interests of constituencies. By the time a president tries to exercise influence on a vote, most members of Congress have made up their minds on the basis of these other factors. Thus, a president's legislative leadership is likely to be critical only for those members of Congress who remain open to conversion after other influences have had their impact. Although the size and composition of this group varies from issue to issue, it will almost always be a minority in each chamber.

#### Disad is triggered either way – the 1AC is the introduction of the bill into the debate – backlash should have already been triggered

#### No controversy – plan is politically popular

Martin 13 (Jeremy, Duncan, University of California-San Diego Institute of the Americas Energy Program Director & Wood, Mexico Institute Director 3/3/2013 “U.S. Should Act Quickly on Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement With Mexico” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12923/u-s-should-act-quickly-on-transboundary-hydrocarbon-agreement-with-mexico>)

These are all positive steps, and their progress will be monitored closely by U.S. and international observers, especially Mexico. But it bears underscoring that further delay in U.S. adoption of the agreement makes little sense. The agreement is not an overly polarizing issue domestically: in fact, quite the opposite. Several lawmakers have described it as a win-win for both Mexico and the U.S.

As the U.S. Congress debates the deal, it is worth revisiting the four key reasons the agreement merits an expeditious approval in the coming weeks. First, approval of the deal in the U.S. would be an important sign of bilateral concord, particularly at the outset of a new administration in Mexico and a second term for Obama. This is important, as it underscores the two nations' increasing ability to work together and conclude complicated agreements—and cooperation—on binational issues unrelated to immigration or crime and drugs.

#### GOP love the plan—house advancement proves

Kasperowicz 6/26 (Pete, staff writer at the Hill, “House advances offshore energy bills”, 6/26/13, <http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/307959-house-advances-offshore-energy-bills>)

The House voted Wednesday in favor of a rule that will allow it to vote on two energy bills this week that are aimed at expanding the development of offshore energy resources.¶ Members voted 235-187 in favor of the rule, which covers two bills: H.R. 2231, the Offshore Energy and Jobs Act, and H.R. 1613, the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act.¶ Republicans supported the first bill as one that would help expand domestic energy development, and said it's needed to counter the Obama administration's restrictions on offshore lease sales.¶ "So in essence you have a bill that makes us more energy independent, drives down the cost of fuel for U.S. families, helps reduce the cost to the federal government, and produces an estimated 1.2 million new jobs. I think by most standards that would be considered a fairly good bill," said Rep. Rob Bishop (R-Utah).¶ Republicans added that President Obama's announcement this week shows Obama is looking to run in the other direction, by seeking to restrict emissions from coal-fired electricity plants. ¶ "The President's latest efforts to impose new energy taxes and government red tape follow four and a half years of erecting American energy roadblocks," House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings (R-Wash.) said.

#### **THA House vote won on broad bipartisan support**

Hastings 6/27 (Doc Hastings, House Committee on Natural Resources, “House Votes to Approve Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement with Mexico”, 6/27/13, <http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=340794>, zs)

Today, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1613, the Outer Continential Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act, with a bipartisan vote of 256-171. This legislation, sponsored by Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03), would approve and implement the terms of the U.S. - Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, signed by the Obama Administration in 2012, that governs the development of shared oil and natural gas resources along the U.S. – Mexico maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico.

#### Expanding Gulf oil coop has political support – House proves

Graeber 13 (Daniel J. Graeber, 4-22-13, Christian Science Monitor “House aims to expand oil drilling in Gulf of Mexico”, April 22, 2013 <http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Energy-Voices/2013/0422/House-aims-to-expand-oil-drilling-in-Gulf-of-Mexico>,)

British energy company BP announced that its mega Mad Dog project in the Gulf of Mexico wasn't necessarily as attractive as once thought. Oil companies like BP are looking to get things moving again three years after the tragedy tied to the Deep-water Horizon oilrig. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives last week proposed legislation that would open up more areas for drillers offshore. Lawmakers say getting more work done in the Gulf of Mexico would ensure energy independence. The oil industry says U.S. oil production is setting records, however, so it's not yet clear what, if any, interest there is to return so quickly back to the Gulf of Mexico.

BP announced it was reviewing a decision to move ahead with its multibillion-dollar Mad Dog development in the Gulf of Mexico. The company started production in the field in 2005 with a facility designed to process 80,000 barrels of oil and 60,000 cubic feet of natural gas per day. The entire field is estimated to hold 4 billion barrels of oil equivalent. BP said Friday it wasn't necessarily keen to move ahead with the second phase of development there, however. (Related article: Obama’s Budget Proposal Boosts Clean Energy at the Expense of Fossil Fuels) "The current development plan for Mad Dog Phase 2 is not as attractive as previously modeled, due largely to market conditions and industry inflation," the company said in a statement. Lawmakers in the House of Representatives last week introduced legislation that would amend laws regarding the U.S. continental shelf to make it easier for oil companies to work along the shared maritime border with Mexico. The measure would facilitate the implementation of a bilateral agreement signed last year on Transboundary resources. Under that agreement, roughly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico would open up to energy explorers. The U.S. Interior Department's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management estimates the region may hold as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. "We can achieve energy independence and better energy cooperation with our neighbor and this is an important step in that direction," said Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Chairman Matt Salmon, R-Ariz., in a statement. (Related article: UK Renews Drive for Offshore Oil and Gas) The American Petroleum Institute reports that U.S. oil production in March increased 13.8 percent year-on-year to 7.1 million barrels per day. Crude oil stocks, meanwhile, reached a record for March at 387.9 million bpd. In terms of imports, API reports that those levels are at their lowest level since 1998 at 10.0 million bpd, a 5.3 percent drop year-on-year. This comes against lower petroleum deliveries, a reflection of demand. API states U.S. petroleum deliveries are down about 0.4 percent for the first quarter of the year, reflecting an economic recovery that's like "a sputtering engine with a cylinder or two still not firing," said chief economist John Felmy.

#### Backlash already – plan key

Clark 12 (Aaron, “Obama Stance on Fossil Fuel Angers Industry,” Bloomberg, 1-24, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/obama-claiming-credit-for-fossil-fuel-gains-angers-industry.html)

President Barack Obama is taking credit for higher U.S. oil and gas production and lower imports, angering industry groups and Republicans who say he is working against domestic energy production. American energy will be a major theme of Obama’s State of the Union address to Congress tonight, Jay Carney, the White House spokesman, said in a briefing yesterday. In his first campaign ad this year, Obama boasts that U.S. dependence on foreign oil is below 50 percent for the first time in 13 years. Since Obama took office, U.S. natural gas production averaged 1.89 trillion cubic feet a month through October, 13 percent higher than the average during President George W. Bush’s two terms, according to Energy Department data. Crude oil production is 2 percent higher, the department said. “To be sure that is not because the White House meant for that to happen,” said Pavel Molchanov, an analyst at Raymond James & Associates Inc. Republicans say the numbers are misleading. Onshore oil and gas production on federal lands directly under Obama’s control is down 40 percent compared to 10 years ago, according to Spencer Pederson, a spokesman for Representative Doc Hastings, a Washington Republican and chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee. In 2010, the U.S. signed the fewest number of offshore drilling leases since 1984. ‘Drill Baby Drill’ “The president is responding to what America’s gut feeling is, that we should be less dependent on foreign oil, and he’s trying to take credit for it,” Hastings said in an interview. “His policies are exactly the opposite.” Four years ago, Obama campaigned against Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin’s rally to “Drill Baby Drill.” Today he is highlighting fossil fuel gains to blunt charges that his policies are contributing to higher energy costs, according to Tyson Slocum, energy program director for Public Citizen, a Washington-based consumer advocacy group, said in an interview. “The Republican narrative is that Obama is shoveling huge amounts of money to his cronies in the renewable industry, and blocking the real energy that American needs,” Slocum said in an interview. “It’s a false narrative. The administration has been focused on green energy, but they haven’t been against fossil fuels.” Federal Leases In a January report, the American Petroleum Institute in Washington said that in two years the number of new leases to drill on federal lands declined 44 percent to 1,053 in 2010. The report blamed “new rules, policies and administrative actions that are not conducive to oil and natural gas production.” Lower imports are the result of lower demand, and increasing production has come despite Obama’s policies, according to Jack Gerard, American Petroleum Institute President. The U.S. needs a “course correction” on energy policy that includes faster permitting on federal lands in the West and in the Gulf of Mexico, he said. The group, whose members include Exxon Mobil Corp., the largest U.S. oil company, convened a conference call with reporters today to comment on what Obama is expected to say on domestic energy in tonight’s address. “We hope that the actions match the words,” Gerard said on the call. “The truth is that the administration has sometimes paid lip service to more domestic energy development, including more oil and natural gas development.” Offshore Drilling The American Enterprise Institute, a Washington group that supports free markets, called Obama’s Jan. 18 decision to deny a permit for TransCanada Corp. (TRP)’s $7 billion Keystone XL oil pipeline, part of his “crusade against fossil fuels.” “The losses due to the Obama administration’s death-grip on offshore drilling and its unwillingness to open federal lands or issue timely permits for exploration far outweigh any energy gains that the White House may tout this week,” Thomas Pyle, president of the Washington-based Institute for Energy Research, said in a statement. Obama last year called on Congress to eliminate “billions in taxpayer” subsidies for oil companies and to invest instead in renewable sources of power. In 2010, he proposed drilling for oil and natural gas off the U.S. East Coast, weeks before BP Plc (BP/)’s Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico failed, spewing 4.9 million barrels of oil and triggering a temporary administration ban on offshore exploration.

#### No link – plan isn’t an opportunity cost – a logical policy maker could do both

## 2AC – Dip Cap

### 2AC – Dip Cap

#### No impact

Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, ‘7

(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, policymakers should keep in mind that the unprecedented is also unlikely . Outliers in international behaviour do exist, but in general the past is the best guide to the future. Since the geopolitical catastrophes that pessimists expect will follow US withdrawal are all virtually without precedent, common sense should tell policymakers they are probably also unlikely to occur. Five years ago, US leaders should have realised that their implicit prediction for the aftermath of invasion - positive, creative instability in the Middle East that would set off a string of democratic dominoes - was without precedent. The policy was based more on the president's unshakeable faith in the redemptive power of democracy than on a coherent understanding of international relations. Like all faith-based policies, success would have required a miracle; in international politics, miracles are unfortunately rare. Faith is once again driving predictions of post-withdrawal Iraq, but this time it is faith in chaos and worst-case scenarios. Secondly, imagined consequences are usually worse than what reality delivers . Human beings tend to focus on the most frightening scenarios at the expense of the most likely, and anticipate outcomes far worse than those that usually occur. This is especially true in the United States, which for a variety of reasons has consistently overestimated the dangers lurking in the international system.3 Pre-war Iraq was no exception; post-war Iraq is not likely to be either.

Peace process fails AND isn’t key- other events driving Mid-east politics

Landler 13 -- NY Times White House correspondent

(Mark, and Jodi Rudoren, Jerusalem bureau chief of NYT, "Chaos in Middle East Grows as the U.S. Focuses on Israel," NY Times, 7-1-13, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/mideast-chaos-grows-as-us-focuses-on-israel.html?hp&\_r=0, accessed 7-18-13,)

In Damascus, the Syrian government’s forces are digging in against rebels in a bloody civil war that is swiftly approaching the grim milestone of 100,000 dead. In Cairo, an angry tide of protesters again threatens an Egyptian president. At the same time, in tranquil Tel Aviv, Secretary of State John Kerry wrapped up a busy round of shuttle diplomacy, laboring to revive a three-decade-old attempt at peace negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. He insisted on Sunday that he had made “real progress.” The new secretary of state’s exertions — reminiscent of predecessors like Henry A. Kissinger and James A. Baker III — have been met with the usual mix of hope and skepticism. But with so much of the Middle East still convulsing from the effects of the Arab Spring, Mr. Kerry’s efforts raise questions about the Obama administration’s priorities at a time of renewed regional unrest. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, once a stark symbol and source of grievance in the Arab world, is now almost a sideshow in a Middle East consumed by sectarian strife, economic misery and, in Egypt, a democratically elected leader fighting for legitimacy with many of his people. “The moment for this kind of diplomacy has passed,” said Robert Blecher, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Program of the International Crisis Group. “He’s working with actors who have acted in this movie before, and the script is built around the same elements. But the theater is new; the region is a completely different place today.” Administration officials no longer argue, as they did early in President Obama’s first term, that ending the Israeli occupation and creating a Palestinian state is the key to improving the standing of the United States in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now just one headache among a multitude.

#### Upheaval hardens positions- doesn’t help lead to a deal

Landler 13 -- NY Times White House correspondent

(Mark, and Jodi Rudoren, Jerusalem bureau chief of NYT, "Chaos in Middle East Grows as the U.S. Focuses on Israel," NY Times, 7-1-13, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/mideast-chaos-grows-as-us-focuses-on-israel.html?hp&\_r=0, accessed 7-18-13, mss)

But several Israeli analysts said the reverse was true: the unrest has made Israel more concerned about security than about taking risks to advance the peace process. Sallai Meridor, a former Israeli ambassador to the United States, said most Israelis would rank Syria, Iran, Egypt and Jordan above the Palestinians in terms of “importance and urgency.” A day after Mr. Kerry concluded 13 hours of talks with Mr. Netanyahu, Israeli newspapers were dominated by images of the vast protests in Egypt. Five of the six major daily papers did not even carry front-page reports on Mr. Kerry’s diplomacy. “Were you to ask people in the leadership of both Israel and the Palestinians whether they thought resolving the conflict now, given the developments in the region, is feasible, most people would tell you it’s quite unlikely,” Mr. Meridor said. As for the Palestinians, some analysts said Mr. Abbas felt as vulnerable as ever about protracted negotiations with Mr. Netanyahu, particularly without preconditions. A preoccupied Egypt would leave the Palestinian Authority without crucial political support. “Abbas would say that to reach a deal, you need Arab support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt,” said Ghaith al-Omari, the executive director of the American Task Force on Palestine. “With all the chaos, you might not get that.”

#### Peace talks are failing—Palestinians and Israelis can’t agree on settlements

AFP 7/18 (“Fatah, Israel snub Kerry draft peace plan” Alakhbar English) http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/israel-open-peace-negotiations-along-1967-borders-official-says)

Palestinian politicians rebuffed Thursday a peace blueprint hashed out by US Secretary of State John Kerry with president Mahmoud Abbas in a major blow to the American politician's marathon peace efforts. A senior Fatah official said the party wanted changes to what Abbas had agreed. "Fatah wants to make some alterations to Kerry's plan... because the proposed ideas are not encouraging for a return to negotiations," said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity. "The central committee is demanding, for a return to talks... that Kerry announce they should be based on the 1967 lines," said Amin Maqbul, secretary general of the ruling Fatah movement's Revolutionary Council. Meanwhile, a spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denied Thursday previous reports stating that Israel had agreed to a proposed formula for new peace talks with the Palestinians under which the border of their future state would be along lines that existed before the 1967 Middle East war. An Israeli official had previously said on Thursday that Israel was open to talks based on the 1967 borders, but with agreed land swaps and Palestine recognizing Israel as a "Jewish state." The rejection of the plan by the governing Revolutionary Council of Abbas's own Fatah movement before it had even been put to the wider Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which includes leftist factions more hostile to a compromise, meaning the blueprint was likely to be put on hold. A US official acknowledged that Kerry was now unlikely to be able to announce a resumption of direct peace negotiations despite extending until Friday his sixth visit to the region in as many months. "There are currently no plans for an announcement on the resumption of negotiations," said State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki. Kerry had urged Israel on Wednesday afternoon to carefully consider a 2002 peace initiative approved by the Arab League. "Israel needs to look hard at this initiative, which promises Israel peace with 22 Arab nations and 35 Muslim nations - a total of 57 nations that are standing and waiting for the possibility of making peace with Israel," he had said. The plan, put forward by Saudi Arabia at an Arab League summit in Beirut in 2002, offered full recognition of Israel but only if it gave up all land seized in the 1967 Middle East war and agreed to a "just solution" for Palestinian refugees. Softening the plan three months ago, a top Qatari official raised the possibility of land swaps in setting future Israeli-Palestinian borders. Kerry said on Wednesday after talks with Abbas in neighboring Jordan that gaps between the sides had "very significantly" narrowed. An Arab League committee endorsed Kerry's proposals for resuming peace talks, saying they "provide the ground and a suitable environment to start negotiations." However, the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which are considered illegal under international law, is still to be resolved. Palestinians are refusing to return to negotiations without a freeze on settlement activity, a possibility Israel has ruled out as it has greenlighted the constructions of hundreds of settlement homes in the past several months.

#### Peace talks will fail now—Fatah

Ronen 7/18 (Gil, staff writer, 7-18-13, “Palestinians Torpedo Kerry Plan to Restart Negotiations” Israel National News) http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/170048#.Ueif2o2siSo)

Fatah - the party of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and the dominant faction within the PA - has effectively torpedoed U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's plan for restarting negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, a report by AFP indicates. According to the report, Fatah officials demanded on Thursday that changes be made to Kerry's Middle East peace plan, following a meeting in Ramallah. The move means it is likely the PA will also reject the plan. "Fatah wants to make some alterations to Kerry's plan... because the proposed ideas are not encouraging for a return to negotiations," a top official from Fatah said. "The central committee is demanding, for a return to talks... that Kerry announce they should be based on the 1967 lines," said Amin Maqbul, secretary general of the ruling Fatah movement's Revolutionary Council. The vote came after two rounds of intensive talks between Kerry and Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas on Tuesday and Wednesday, in which they thrashed out the plan. Abbas is also Fatah's leader. It was the top US diplomat's sixth visit to the region in as many months to try to broker a compromise formula to allow a resumption of direct peace talks after a three-year hiatus. Israel had rejected Palestinian demands for a publicly declared freeze to all settlement construction in Judea and Samaria as a condition to resume talks, and Abbas and his negotiating team had referred those terms to the Palestinian political leadership.

#### Pakistan thumps the DA – Kerry is focused on Pakistan

Samad 8/3 (Omar Samad, Senior Central Asia Fellow at New America Foundation, President of Silkroad Consulting, and former Afghan ambassador to France and Canada, “John Kerry’s Message to Pakistan”, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/03/john-kerry-s-message-to-pakistan.html)

Secretary of State John Kerry had several important messages to deliver to Pakistani leaders this week in Islamabad, but one stood out in terms of its strategic significance: The U.S. is not leaving Afghanistan any time soon. He expressed [strong confidence](http://www.khaama.com/kerry-assures-afghan-us-security-agreement-will-be-signed-2297%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) that a security agreement will soon be signed with Kabul allowing a residual U.S. (and NATO) force to stay on after 2014. John Kerry speaks with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the Prime Minister's House in Islamabad on August 1. (Aamir Qureshi/AFP/Getty) That was not what Taliban backers and radical militants wanted to hear. With the U.S. clarifying its Afghanistan position, Pakistan’s military establishment and the new civilian government now have a unique opportunity to revisit and adjust their longstanding policy toward their beleaguered Western neighbor. By doing so, Pakistan can break with passé policies of strategic tolerance of militant sanctuaries and support networks on their soil, push reconcilable Taliban toward meaningful talks, reduce the threat of militancy within its own borders, engage in an open and forward-looking dialogue to address border and water issues, and focus on cooperation and regional economic integration at a time when economic prospects [are dim](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/03/john-kerry-s-message-to-pakistan.html) and millions of dissatisfied people are on the verge of despair. For that to happen, now is the time for President Obama to spell out the post-2014 U.S. commitment in terms of troop numbers and effective assistance to help Afghans stand on their own, safely undergo a complex transition period, be assured of long-term international assistance, and eventually reach a just peace accord with reconcilable armed militants—if there are any to be found. The latest Pentagon estimate that Afghan forces will need U.S. assistance for several more years after the end of the current mission is a clear indicator of job-not-done. Leaving behind a fragile and unstable Afghanistan serves no strategic or clever purpose. In Afghanistan, now is the time for President Karzai to visit Pakistan one more time (date expected to be announced soon) with a coherent policy that can garner the backing of the Afghan people, can provide the Pakistanis with a clear vision for peace and good-neighborliness, and is not tied to short-term political advantage. He needs to think long and beyond the next Afghan elections scheduled for April 2014. Leaving behind a fragile and unstable Afghanistan serves no strategic or clever purpose. Since a Loya Jirga convened in 2011 has already agreed to a U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership framework, Karzai should engage in high-level political consultations at [home and](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/03/john-kerry-s-message-to-pakistan.html) allow the Afghan parliament to legitimize the bilateral security agreement with the U.S. instead of taking the route of a second controversial Loya Jirga as he has indicated. Both the U.S. and Afghan governments would also be better served if they adopted a more constructive and trusting working relationship over the critical year ahead. As far as the Taliban are concerned, this is the time for their mystery-shrouded pro-reconciliation lobby to prove its credentials, speak up, and push for a change in tactics within the movement. That means stop the killing frenzy. Afghans will not agree to reconcile with cold-blooded murderers, unless they can prove otherwise. The latest United Nations figures show a staggering [increase of 23 percent](http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/31/world/asia/afghanistan-civilian-casualties%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) in civilian losses over the past six months. What is more troubling is that more than 75 percent of deaths are caused by Taliban/militant attacks. If they are unable to convince the hardliners in their midst to stop killing innocent fellow Muslims, then it is their Islamic duty to walk away or fight them to prove to other Afghans that there really is a faction preferring peace talks over continued conflict. This lobby cannot [continue](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/03/john-kerry-s-message-to-pakistan.html) to have their cake and eat it too. Concerning the hardcore wing of the militancy, they will continue to fight, kill and destroy. They will fight Western interests opportunistically, send men to other combat zones, [including Syria](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/20137167916826540.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), and increasingly engage in sectarian strife. They are organic allies of al Qaeda, Central Asian jihadists and other like-minded terrorist groups. If the Afghan and Pakistani governments can break the ice, aim for genuine rapprochement, and build up mutual trust based on a paradigm shift in Islamabad and a balanced approach by Kabul, then they could join hands in fighting these elements on both sides of the border and in return receive generous international assistance. But if the game is to let the war linger for some Machiavellian reason, be tempted to use Sunni radicals against Shia extremists in the region, aim for a zero-sum outcome and risk stability in South-Central Asia for many years to come, then we might end up with a lose-lose scenario. Secretary Kerry’s message to his friends in Pakistan has resonance across the region and beyond. The ball is squarely in the Pakistani court, and now is the time to engage in deep strategic soul-searching and reconfiguration. Much is at stake for the sake of peace, justice and prosperity in that part of the world.

#### No internal link – we engage with Mexico all the time which proves it doesn’t Dip Cap

#### There is no internal link – Kerry can focus on multiple issues at once and be super effective

Burns 7/31 (Nicholas Burns, a professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “John Kerry’s six-month report card”, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html>)

Until a few weeks ago, a small army of critics and armchair quarterbacks took aim at Secretary of State John Kerry’s first months in office in roughly similar fashion — too much globe-trotting, too many meetings, and too singular a focus on the lost cause of diplomacy — the 65-year search for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Kerry thus deserves more than a little credit with this week’s resumption in Washington of the first meaningful talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority since 2008. It is a significant achievement, and it is largely his own. It is also indicative of how Kerry does business — with persistence, drive, energy, secrecy, and attention to detail, all at warp speed. Kerry is putting diplomacy back on the [map](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html). He has embraced his role as America’s top diplomat and is reasserting America’s primacy in the two pivotal regions for US security — the Middle East and Asia. American secretaries of state are expected by the rest of the world to lead on the toughest issues as combination referee, dealmaker, and frequent flyer. Kerry has played those roles confidently since taking office in January. He is also following former Secretary of State George Shultz’s advice to “tend the diplomatic garden.” In other words, it is important to show up in a distant capital with no immediate crisis to overcome. Demonstrating interest and respect and deepening personal connections with [global leaders](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html) makes it more likely they’ll see things our way when we need them, as we invariably will. Kerry did not set out to break Hillary Clinton’s mileage record, but that may become one measure of his ultimate success. In just six months, Kerry has delivered progress on some of America’s most important priorities. The Middle East talks are significant. If Kerry and his capable new envoy, Martin Indyk, can generate momentum on borders, Jerusalem, and [settlements](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html), it may create the best opportunity for progress since President Clinton’s 2000 Camp David talks. It is a long way from peace but a situation no one would have predicted even a month ago. He is reasserting America’s primacy in the two pivotal regions for US security— the Middle East and Asia. Further East, Kerry and Vice President Joe Biden, both recent visitors to New Delhi, have begun to revive a major aim of President George W. Bush — a strategic partnership with India in troubled South Asia. And, on North Korea, Kerry worked quietly and effectively with Beijing last March to contain Pyongyang’s erratic and unpredictable young leader, Kim Jung Un. After Iraq and Afghanistan, Kerry is right to return diplomacy to the front ranks of US strategy. Critics impatient with Kerry’s six trips to the Middle East would do well to remember the time it took to create some of the most significant recent American diplomatic successes. Henry Kissinger spent well more than a year in executing his brilliant opening to China. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, James Baker worked nonstop for 10 months to achieve Germany’s stunning unification in NATO. And the Clinton administration required nearly three years to get Bosnia right before Richard Holbrooke brokered his masterful peace at Dayton. The point is that diplomacy takes time. The veteran negotiator George Mitchell framed it best by reminding his own critics that, in Northern Ireland, he had “700 days of failure and one day of success” — the day he reached the Good Friday Agreement for peace. Kerry has many more mountains to climb as secretary of state. The Iran nuclear challenge will return to the front burner following this week’s inauguration of President Hassan Rowhani. Kerry needs to decide whether he should take the lead in the first American direct negotiations with Tehran in decades. Reaching a compromise deal with Iran will require the same unyielding personal commitment he has given to Israeli-Palestinian peace. But it is the best way to avoid a military conflict in 2014. In addition, Kerry will need to push Congress toward a more effective US position on climate change. And, Kerry has an opening to strengthen our alliance with a resurgent Japan and maintain America’s predominance in Asia. Can he find a way, at the same time, to work effectively with China? The challenges never go away. But Kerry is building in his first six months on the job a promising record of accomplishment in Foggy Bottom.

#### Backlash should have already been triggered—the 1AC is the introduction of the bill—Dip Cap should have been invested

#### Egypt thumps

Landler 13 -- NY Times White House correspondent

(Mark, and Jodi Rudoren, Jerusalem bureau chief of NYT, "Chaos in Middle East Grows as the U.S. Focuses on Israel," NY Times, 7-1-13, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/mideast-chaos-grows-as-us-focuses-on-israel.html?hp&\_r=0, accessed 7-18-13,)

Mr. **Kerry** has made it clear that he will not give up his peacemaking quest. But analysts said that the gravity of the crisis in Egypt would force him and other senior officials to shift their attention to Cairo, where American policy, some say, has failed to keep up with events.

**Disad’s not intrinsic—a logical policy maker could do both**

**Diplomatic capital is not being invested in the peace process now**

**The Japan Times 13** (4-3-13, “Symbols, substance in the Mideast” Editorial) http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/03/editorials/symbols-substance-in-the-mideast/#.UcswTPmsiSo

In truth, Mr. Obama’s commitment to the defense of Israel has not wavered. His overtures to the Islamic world reflected a desire to undo the damage done by the Bush administration’s global war on terror. He kept a distance from the Middle East peace process — although he created a special envoy to the negotiations — because neither Israelis nor Palestinians were ready to take hard steps needed for a durable peace. Cognizant that the region has long been a graveyard of U.S. diplomats’ dreams, Mr. Obama decided to preserve his diplomatic capital until circumstances indicated that there was a real chance of success. That moment is not yet here. But dynamics in the region, along with his re-election, demanded that he refocus on the Middle East, and a visit was overdue. The trip had several objectives. Mr. Obama had to win the confidence of the Israeli people, and assure them — and others — of the strength of their relationship with the U.S. At the same time, he had to make the case for the Palestinians without suggesting that there is a zero-sum relationship between the two.

#### Dip Cap thesis wrong – Kerry makes unannounced trip to Afghanistan

Lee 10/11 (Matthew http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/11/john-kerry-afghanistan-visit\_n\_4083786.html) rss

The future of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan after the last troops leave at the end of 2014 may depend on whether U.S. officials like Secretary of State John Kerry can allay Afghan President Hamid Karzai's worries about sovereignty, Pakistan and the safety of Afghan citizens at the hands of Western troops.¶ Kerry began urgent talks Friday with Karzai as an end-of-October deadline loomed for a security deal that would allow American troops to remain in Afghanistan after the NATO-led military mission ends next year.¶ Kerry's unannounced visit to Kabul comes as talks on the bilateral security agreement have foundered over issues of Afghan sovereignty despite a year of negotiations.

#### Shutdown destroying diplomatic capital

Good 10/5 (Chris, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/10/john-kerry-shutdown-is-damaging-u-s-diplomacy-but-well-move-past-it/) rss

Walking a fine line between shaming House Republicans and reassuring the world that the U.S. economy will survive, Secretary of State John Kerry told reporters in Bali that the government shutdown is damaging foreign policy efforts — but only for the moment.¶ “I am absolutely confident that when we get this moment of political silliness behind us, we will be back on track, that the world will respect and want to be part of,” Kerry said today in Indonesia, where he is attending meetings at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.¶ President Obama was scheduled to attend next week but canceled his trip to stay in Washington while Republicans and Democrats negotiate off and on over how to fund the federal government and bring roughly 800,000 furloughed employees back to work.¶ Pointing a finger at Republicans who have refused to fund the government if it means allowing provisions of the Affordable Care Act to take effect, Kerry said the president will miss the summit to address a domestic challenge “presented to him by a small group of people within one branch of the United States Congress.”¶ Missing the trip because of the shutdown “obviously undermines the president’s ability to have the conversation he was going to have with [Chinese] President Xi [Jinping] … or the meeting he was going to have with President Putin, all of which are important to the conduct of global affairs,” Kerry said.¶ The Obama administration has previously stated a desire to “pivot” its diplomatic focus toward Asia. Obama’s cancellation of a major trip to Asia has been seen my some as hurting that effort.¶ The State Department has griped about the government shutdown all week, pointing to negative editorials written about the U.S. in foreign press and telling reporters the shutdown has prevented the Treasury and the State Department from being able to fully enforce economic sanctions against Iran and Syria.¶ At the same time, Kerry reassured world leaders that the shutdown will only have a “momentary” effect and that the U.S. economy is not in danger.¶ “This will end and the United States will have a budget. And the United States will still be the strongest power in the world, in terms of our military capacity, largest economy in the world, an economy that is now increasingly stronger by the day,” Kerry said.¶ “We all know that we will get beyond this moment, and we will get beyond it quickly,” Kerry said.

#### No Link – Obama would send Hillary Clinton as she negotiated the deal in 2012

#### No Link – committees do the work

Oil and Gas Journal 10/7 (http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-10/regular-features/watching-government/transboundary-treaty-glitch.html)

The federal government's partial shutdown didn't keep the US Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee from discussing the pending US-Mexico transboundary hydrocarbons agreement on Oct. 1. But the hearing barely mentioned the main obstacle to its being ratified.¶ Chairman Ronald L. Wyden (D-Ore.) twice mentioned his desire to see the treaty adopted "quickly and cleanly," but did not specify what the main problem was. There obviously was one since the hearing was to consider two separate bills: S 812, which he introduced on Apr. 25, and HR 1613, which US Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-SC) introduced a week earlier and the House passed on June 27.¶ It fell to one of the witnesses—Carlos Pasqual, special envoy and energy affairs coordinator at the US Department of State—to explain the problem: While the Obama administration supports ratifying the treaty, it dislikes a provision in Duncan's bill that would waive Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act requiring US companies to disclose payments to foreign governments.¶ Duncan has said this is necessary to get US companies to invest in joint ventures with Mexico's state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos. Others argue that the hydrocarbons potential within the two countries' Gulf of Mexico maritime border may be enough to encourage the necessary outside investment if the US ratifies the treaty.¶ "We believe the agreement would help facilitate the safe and responsible management of offshore petroleum reservoirs that straddle our maritime boundary and strengthen our bilateral relations overall," Pasqual testified on Oct. 1.¶ Mexico ratified the treaty soon after it was signed in 2012. The country's new president, Enrique Pena Nieto, proposed energy regime reforms earlier this year that would allow contracts between Pemex and outside companies for the first time since 1938.

### 2AC – China

#### US is increasing engagement with Mexico all the time—takes out the disad

#### No CCP collapse—the government represses instability

Pei ‘9 (Minxin, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/12. “Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-crisis)

It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.

#### **And the plan doesn’t completely take over Latin America—it establishes a bilateral agreement with Mexico over energy—hold them to a high threshold to prove that specifically the plan crowds out other countries from Latin America**

#### **And even if American influence is declining—it is inevitable**

Valencia 6/24 (Robert Valencia, writer for World Policy, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America”, 6/24/13, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america>, zs)

The United States hasn’t lost Latin America, and is unlikely to lose it completely. It is still the region’s top trade partner. The United States has recently signed free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, and maintains other trade agreements with Peru, Chile, and Mexico. Central American and several Caribbean countries rely upon U.S. military cooperation in an attempt to curtail drug trade. Nevertheless, the post 9/11 years severely eroded U.S.-Latin American relations as the Bush administration focused heavily on the war on terror, often ignoring issues in Latin America.

#### TPP makes US engagement with Latin America inevitable

Sarukhan 12 (Arturo Sarukhan, Mexican Ambassador to the U.S. since February 2007, “Viewpoints: What Should the Top Priority Be for U.S. – Mexican Relations?” American Society/Council of the Americas, 12/3/12, [www.as-coa.org/articles/viewpoints-what-should-top-priority-be-us-mexican-relations](http://www.as-coa.org/articles/viewpoints-what-should-top-priority-be-us-mexican-relations))

Over the past two decades, NAFTA has dramatically altered the way Mexico and the United States engage with one another. However, much more can and should be done to bring North American competitiveness back to a starring role on the global stage. This is why the participation of all three North American countries in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will be so important. The TPP will enable us to discuss measures that meet the needs and challenges of twenty-first-century free and fair trade, such as compatibility of regulatory systems, new environmental provisions, strong protection for intellectual property rights, and emerging areas such as digital technologies and e-commerce. The TPP will further deepen and strengthen the integrated supply and production chains between our two countries. And as a true coalition of the free-trade willing in the Americas and across the Pacific Rim, the TPP therefore represents the next step in a North American Grand Strategy. In addition to the TPP, we need to continue strengthening the participation and commitment of civil society and the private sector across our common border, as they are true co-stakeholders in our bilateral efforts toward economic progress.

#### US-China influence isn’t zero-sum

Xiaoxia 5/6 (Wang, Staff Writer for the Economic Observer. “In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America” 5/6/13 http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

#### The relationship is trilateral and turn US engagement helps China

Shaiken et al 13 (Harley, Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations Pg 32-33)

If one simply looks at China’s trade surplus with the United States and Mexico, one would assume that China plays a very influential role in the triangular relations between these three nations. However, as the Chinese saying goes, there is no diplomacy for a weak country, implying that developing nations inherently assume a submissive role in relations with economic superpowers. In this sense then, economic power becomes the most important factor in the context of international diplomatic relations. Applied to the framework of the trilateral relationship between China, the United States, and Mexico, this theory clearly assumes the existence of one key player.There is no doubt that the United States is a superpower, not only among these three countries, but also in the world. Although the International Monetary Fund predicts that China will surpass the U.S. in 2016 to become the world’s largest economy, the fact remains that China is still a developing country and only one of the regional powers in Asia, unlike the United States, which is a leading global superpower. The economic performance of the United States remains very impressive. Even though the economy of the U.S. was significantly affected by the international financial crisis, and is still in the process of recovering from an economic recession, the United States finds itself even now in a “unipolar moment” of unchallenged superiority. Therefore, although China is referred to as the second largest economy in the world, such accolades would be dampened if China’s situation were viewed comparatively, as a whole, with the United States. It is clear that China’s economic status has been increasing in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), which is the correct unit of measurement when examining the cost of living. However, “the traditional measure of GDP, calculated in dollars at current exchange rates, [indicates] that the U.S. economy remains nearly six times the size of China’s” (Stallings 2008:241). Furthermore, it is widely known that competitiveness indicates the level of a country’s productivity. According to a report by the World Economic Forum, the U.S. is ranked much higher than both China and Mexico (China: 26th and Mexico: 58th), even though “the U.S. continues its decline for the third year in a row, falling one more place to fifth position” (WEF 2011).¶All of the above-mentioned data indicates that the United States continues to be a prevailing superpower in the world – a particularly relevant fact for both China and Mexico. As for these two nations, both are developing countries, both are listed among the middle-income countries, and their economic performance and GDP per capita are much lower than that of the U.S. However, when we compare China and Mexico to each other, we see that both countries are in the process of modernization, although comparatively speaking, Mexico’s per capita GDP is 2.3 times higher than that of China.¶As the most powerful country in the triangular relationship, the United States has become the most important trade partner for both China and Mexico, as well as a key player in other facets of their relationship:¶(1). For China, the United States is its most important economic partner, a status which is supported by the fact that the U.S. is the second largest export destination for China’s manufacturing products, following only behind Asia as a whole. What is more, China is the most significant shareholder of U.S. stock, and both countries enjoy a close, mutually beneficial relationship in terms of their economies, their militaries, and their cultural and interpersonal exchange. To a certain extent, China and the U.S. are mutually dependent on each other. However, it is worth noting that the United States holds the upper hand in terms of the bilateral relationship between the two nations. Superficially speaking, China’s swift economic growth has greatly strengthened its economy, hence the reason it has been regarded as “world-class economic power” (Smith 2008:215). However, the “commodity boom” is unlikely to last forever (He 2012:31). China’s “manufacturing road” to modernity has become rocky and uncertain for a number of reason: The first is related to increasing labor costs in China, not only compared to what they were before, but also in terms of neighboring countries such as Vietnam and India. According to AlixPartner Consultancy, compensation costs in East Asia – a region that includes China but excludes Japan – rose from 32% of U.S. wages in 2002 to 43% in 2007. And since wages have been increasing at a rate of 8% to 9% a year, taxes have been increasing as well. East Asia’s overall costs have doubtlessly escalated even more during the last two years (Devonshire-Ellis 2011). The effects of wage increase in China have been exemplified by American companies like Adidas leaving China in response to escalated labor costs. What this ultimately means for China is a gradual loss of its comparative advantage as the lowest-cost producer in the manufacturing sector – a status that it has maintained for decades.¶Secondly, United States-based multinational companies (MNCs) are crucial in determining the structure of the global production system, labor mobilization, and international trade flow. China, as the final assembler of goods produced by the MNCs, has enticed such companies with low costs of labor. This has incentivized many MNCs in the manufacturing sector to build accessory plants in China, which now account for over 60% of China’s exports.2 Consequently, MNCs receive a large percentage of these export profits, calling into question the true trade surplus that China has with the U.S. and Mexico. In other words, the United States, as a primary base for MNC-operations, will be a determining factor regarding China’s future economic performance if China continues to follow its manufacturing road.¶Last but not least, China is currently facing numerous domestic problems, such as: (1) a rich government with poor citizens, suggesting that the benefits of economic growth have not been enjoyed by a significant portion of the population; (2) rampant social inequality; and (3) inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, incomplete economic reform, and a semi-market and semi-command economic system. Chinese economist Wu Jinglian has argued that China’s future will be decided based on whether the country advances to a law-based market economy or reverts back to a command economy and state capitalism (Wu 2012). The aforementioned factors have impeded China’s economic development, supporting the contention that “China’s economic clout and status should not be exaggerated” (Roett and Paz 2008:9). In short, it is necessary for China to explore a new model of development - that is, from an export-driven model to one based on innovation - in order to sustain its economic growth.

#### No trade-off – the plan facilitates a trilateral relationship – that’s key

Shaiken et al 13 (Harley, Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, Pg 7-8)

The analysis of Ping Wang highlights that in the Mexico-US-China triangular trade relationship, the United States is the key player. While China’s presence has increased,the United States remains a critical influence on both Mexico and China. Furthermore, the author suggests that China’s rise and emergence in terms of trade and investments in LAC, and specifically in regards to this triangular relationship, will slow increasingly in the future, considering its specialization in industrial commodities and products, rising wages in China, and the high number of multinational corporations involved in Chinese exports. For Ping Wang, the politically and historically subordinated role of Mexico with the United States, in contrast to China’s increasing regional and global status, is a basis for understanding future scenarios in which the Mexico-United States relationship is more stable in comparison to that of China and the United States (where the US, for example, views China as a threat).

#### Plan is key to China relations

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities – Bard College and Editor-at-Large – American Interest, “Energy Revolution 3: The New American Century,” American Interest, 7-18, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/18/energy-revolution-3-the-new-american-century/)

On the whole, a world of energy abundance should be particularly good for U.S.-China relations. If both China and the United States have large energy reserves at home, and if new discoveries globally are making energy more abundant, there is less chance that China and the U.S. will compete for political influence in places like the Middle East. More energy security at home may also lessen the political pressure inside China to build up its naval forces. Oil may calm the troubled waters around China’s shores. The maritime disputes now causing trouble from Korea and Japan to Malaysia and the Philippines will be easier to manage if the potential undersea energy resources are seen as less vital to national economic security. Nationalist passion will still drive tough stands on the maritime issues, but nationalism is a much stronger force when powerful economic arguments share the agenda of radical nationalist groups. If the South China Sea issue is seen as both a question of national pride and, because of perceived energy supply issues, a vital national interest, Chinese policy will be much tougher than if it is simply a question of pride. Depending on the size of China’s unconventional domestic reserves (and some analysts think the country could have something like the equivalent of double Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves), China will feel marginally less constrained by Washington’s global naval supremacy. As it now stands, in any serious clash with China, the U.S. could bring Beijing to its knees with a naval blockade. With much larger domestic energy production, China would be less vulnerable to this threat. This could translate into a greater willingness to take a hard line on international issues.

## 1AR – Round 3

## CP

Seeking Alpha 3/14, http://seekingalpha.com/article/1270551-algae-evs-and-other-clean-energy-distractions-vs-nat-gas-transportation

Bloomberg reported last week that ExxonMobil's (XOM) CEO Rex Tillerson admitted the company's $600,000,000 bet on creating motor fuels from algae may not succeed for at least another 25 years.

We can now add algae to the long list of failed "clean energy" distractions on which U.S. companies and federal policymakers and have wasted many billions of dollars. These include:

## 2NC – Prefer Our Defense

#### a) Best prediction model

Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, ‘7

(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, policymakers should keep in mind that the unprecedented is also unlikely . Outliers in international behaviour do exist, but in general the past is the best guide to the future. Since the geopolitical catastrophes that pessimists expect will follow US withdrawal are all virtually without precedent, common sense should tell policymakers they are probably also unlikely to occur. Five years ago, US leaders should have realised that their implicit prediction for the aftermath of invasion - positive, creative instability in the Middle East that would set off a string of democratic dominoes - was without precedent. The policy was based more on the president's unshakeable faith in the redemptive power of democracy than on a coherent understanding of international relations. Like all faith-based policies, success would have required a miracle; in international politics, miracles are unfortunately rare. Faith is once again driving predictions of post-withdrawal Iraq, but this time it is faith in chaos and worst-case scenarios. Secondly, imagined consequences are usually worse than what reality delivers . Human beings tend to focus on the most frightening scenarios at the expense of the most likely, and anticipate outcomes far worse than those that usually occur. This is especially true in the United States, which for a variety of reasons has consistently overestimated the dangers lurking in the international system.3 Pre-war Iraq was no exception; post-war Iraq is not likely to be either.

#### b) Best Middle East methodology

Luttwak, senior associate – CSIS, professor – Georgetown and Berkeley, 5/26/’7

(Edward, “The middle of nowhere,” Prospect Magazine)

Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is “five minutes to midnight” catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless… And then came the remedy—usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein’s son Abdullah periodically repeating his father’s speech almost verbatim. What actually happens at each of these “moments of truth”—and we may be approaching another one—is nothing much; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough. The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000—about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

#### c) Err neg – even the most extreme wars didn’t escalate

Simon, senior fellow, Mid East Studies – CFR, ‘7

(Steven, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v29n4/cpr29n4-4.html>)

Another fear is regional chaos. This is something that National Security Advisor Steve Hadley has spelled out in a number of places, most recently in the Washington Post. The idea is that, if the United States withdraws from Baghdad, it will be the end of the world as we know it. If you look historically at the experience of the Middle East, though, civil wars do not turn into regional wars. If you look at Algeria, Yemen—even Lebanon, where the Israeli and Syrian piece of it was very carefully controlled by both governments—you did not get a regional war from a civil war.

### Multiple Issues

Peace process fails AND isn’t key- other events driving Mid-east politics

Landler, 13 -- NY Times White House correspondent

[Mark, and Jodi Rudoren, Jerusalem bureau chief of NYT, "Chaos in Middle East Grows as the U.S. Focuses on Israel," NY Times, 7-1-13, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/mideast-chaos-grows-as-us-focuses-on-israel.html?hp&\_r=0, accessed 7-18-13, mss]

In Damascus, the Syrian government’s forces are digging in against rebels in a bloody civil war that is swiftly approaching the grim milestone of 100,000 dead. In Cairo, an angry tide of protesters again threatens an Egyptian president. At the same time, in tranquil Tel Aviv, Secretary of State John Kerry wrapped up a busy round of shuttle diplomacy, laboring to revive a three-decade-old attempt at peace negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. He insisted on Sunday that he had made “real progress.” The new secretary of state’s exertions — reminiscent of predecessors like Henry A. Kissinger and James A. Baker III — have been met with the usual mix of hope and skepticism. But with so much of the Middle East still convulsing from the effects of the Arab Spring, Mr. Kerry’s efforts raise questions about the Obama administration’s priorities at a time of renewed regional unrest. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, once a stark symbol and source of grievance in the Arab world, is now almost a sideshow in a Middle East consumed by sectarian strife, economic misery and, in Egypt, a democratically elected leader fighting for legitimacy with many of his people. “The moment for this kind of diplomacy has passed,” said Robert Blecher, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Program of the International Crisis Group. “He’s working with actors who have acted in this movie before, and the script is built around the same elements. But the theater is new; the region is a completely different place today.” Administration officials no longer argue, as they did early in President Obama’s first term, that ending the Israeli occupation and creating a Palestinian state is the key to improving the standing of the United States in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now just one headache among a multitude.

#### There is no internal link – Kerry can focus on multiple issues at once and be super effective

Burns 7/31/13 (Nicholas Burns, a professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “John Kerry’s six-month report card”, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html)

Until a few weeks ago, a small army of critics and armchair quarterbacks took aim at Secretary of State John Kerry’s first months in office in roughly similar fashion — too much globe-trotting, too many meetings, and too singular a focus on the lost cause of diplomacy — the 65-year search for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Kerry thus deserves more than a little credit with this week’s resumption in Washington of the first meaningful talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority since 2008. ¶ It is a significant achievement, and it is largely his own. It is also indicative of how Kerry does business — with persistence, drive, energy, secrecy, and attention to detail, all at warp speed. ¶ Kerry is putting diplomacy back on the [map](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html). He has embraced his role as America’s top diplomat and is reasserting America’s primacy in the two pivotal regions for US security — the Middle East and Asia. American secretaries of state are expected by the rest of the world to lead on the toughest issues as combination referee, dealmaker, and frequent flyer. Kerry has played those roles confidently since taking office in January. ¶ He is also following former Secretary of State George Shultz’s advice to “tend the diplomatic garden.” In other words, it is important to show up in a distant capital with no immediate crisis to overcome. Demonstrating interest and respect and deepening personal connections with [global leaders](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html) makes it more likely they’ll see things our way when we need them, as we invariably will. Kerry did not set out to break Hillary Clinton’s mileage record, but that may become one measure of his ultimate success.¶ In just six months, Kerry has delivered progress on some of America’s most important priorities. The Middle East talks are significant. If Kerry and his capable new envoy, Martin Indyk, can generate momentum on borders, Jerusalem, and [settlements](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html), it may create the best opportunity for progress since President Clinton’s 2000 Camp David talks. It is a long way from peace but a situation no one would have predicted even a month ago. ¶ He is reasserting America’s primacy in the two pivotal regions for US security— the Middle East and Asia.¶ Further East, Kerry and Vice President Joe Biden, both recent visitors to New Delhi, have begun to revive a major aim of President George W. Bush — a strategic partnership with India in troubled South Asia. And, on North Korea, Kerry worked quietly and effectively with Beijing last March to contain Pyongyang’s erratic and unpredictable young leader, Kim Jung Un. ¶ After Iraq and Afghanistan, Kerry is right to return diplomacy to the front ranks of US strategy. Critics impatient with Kerry’s six trips to the Middle East would do well to remember the time it took to create some of the most significant recent American diplomatic successes. Henry Kissinger spent well more than a year in executing his brilliant opening to China. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, James Baker worked nonstop for 10 months to achieve Germany’s stunning unification in NATO. And the Clinton administration required nearly three years to get Bosnia right before Richard Holbrooke brokered his masterful peace at Dayton.¶ The point is that diplomacy takes time. The veteran negotiator George Mitchell framed it best by reminding his own critics that, in Northern Ireland, he had “700 days of failure and one day of success” — the day he reached the Good Friday Agreement for peace.¶ Kerry has many more mountains to climb as secretary of state. The Iran nuclear challenge will return to the front burner following this week’s inauguration of President Hassan Rowhani. Kerry needs to decide whether he should take the lead in the first American direct negotiations with Tehran in decades. Reaching a compromise deal with Iran will require the same unyielding personal commitment he has given to Israeli-Palestinian peace. But it is the best way to avoid a military conflict in 2014. In addition, Kerry will need to push Congress toward a more effective US position on climate change. And, Kerry has an opening to strengthen our alliance with a resurgent Japan and maintain America’s predominance in Asia. Can he find a way, at the same time, to work effectively with China?¶ The challenges never go away. But Kerry is building in his first six months on the job a promising record of accomplishment in Foggy Bottom.

## PTX

### EVERY 1ar

#### Politics DA isn’t true

**Matthews, 12 –** (Jason Matthews, Director of Congressional and Public Affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. November 9, 2012. “Interview with Jason Matthews,” http://debateandtherealworld.com/article.php?id=6)//SDL

D+TRW: Is it possible that the passage of legislation unrelated to the fiscal cliff negotiations during the lame duck session might disrupt efforts to avoid the fiscal cliff?¶ Matthews: That is virtually impossible. The discussions on fiscal cliff will be occurring at the leadership level. Only a very narrow element of the Congress will be involved in the discussions and negotiations. The Congress routinely is working on two or three major pieces of legislation for floor consideration within its various standing committees or conference committees with the other chamber. The whole committee structure of the Congress was created to allow legislation in a variety of areas to be considered and disposed of simultaneously.

#### Aff isn’t noticed by Obama and costs NO political capital

**Ham, 11 –** (Shane Ham, former senior analyst at the Progressive Policy Institute, November 9, 2011. “Interview with Shane Ham” http://debateandtherealworld.com/article.php?id=7)//SDL

Ham: Political capital is not an amount in a savings account; it is better thought of as the limits of a president's time and attention. When Obama was fighting for his health care plan, it used virtually all of his capital, but there are thousands of initiatives pushed by the White House each year that go unnoticed by the president, the press, and most members of Congress. A small-scale diplomatic initiative would probably only be noticed by the relevant committee chairs, if at all. As long as the chairs get a piece of the pie, most likely in the form of naming some of the participants in the exchange program themselves, Obama would not waste a minute of his time on the issue. It wouldn't cost Obama any political capital, because almost nobody would know the program exists.

### 1ar - PC Isn’t real

**Extend Beckmann and Kumar 11 – the negative team has severely mishandled this argument – the fact is that political capital DOES NOT exist – ideology statistically outweighs political capital – statistics prove that the only thing that matters when voting is the ideological distance between the president and the voter**

**8% chance of the internal link**

Matthew N **Beckmann and** Vimal **Kumar 11**, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, econ prof at the Indian Institute of Tech, “Opportunism in Polarization”, Presidential Studies Quarterly; Sep 2011; 41, 3

The final important piece in our theoretical model—presidents' political capital— also finds support in these analyses, though the results here are less reliable. Presidents operating under the specter of strong economy and high approval ratings get an important, albeit moderate, increase in their chances for prevailing on "key" Senate roll-call votes (b = .10, se = .06, p < .10). Figure 4 displays the substantive implications of these results in the context of polarization, showing that going from the lower third of political capital to the upper third increases presidents' chances for success by 8 percentage points (in a setting like 2008). Thus, political capital's impact does provide an important boost to presidents' success on Capitol Hill, but it is certainly not potent enough to overcome basic congressional realities. Political capital is just strong enough to put a presidential thumb on the congressional scales, which often will not matter, but can in close cases.

#### PC not key – research found zero correlation between trying to persuade congress and vote counts – ideology, personal views, commitments, constituencies all overwhelm – even if PC has some affect – its applied to late – that’s Edwards – prefer studies

Edwards, 9 – Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford [George, “The Strategic President”, Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 9-10]

The tenacity with which many commentators embrace the persuasive potential of political leadership is striking. They routinely explain historic shifts in public policy such as those in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1980s in terms of the extraordinary persuasiveness of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Ronald Reagan. Equally striking is the lack of evidence of the persuasive power of the presidency. Observers in both the press and the academy base their claims about the impact of such leadership on little or no systematic evidence and seemingly little reflection. There is not a single systematic study that demonstrates that presidents can reliably move others to support them. Perhaps faith in the potential of persuasive leadership persists because such a view simplifies political analysis. Because broader forces that may influence changes in policy are complex and perhaps even intractable, focusing primarily on the individual as leader eases the burden of explaining policy change. Faith in the persuasive presidency also simplifies the evaluation of the problems of governing. If it is reasonable to expect the White House to create opportunities for change, then failures of leadership must be personal deficiencies. If problems arise because the leader lacks the proper will, skills, or understanding, then the solution to our need for leadership is straightforward and simple: Elect presidents who are willing and able to lead. Because the system is responsive to appropriate leadership, it will function smoothly with the right leader in the Oval Office. The blame for unsuccessful leadership lies with the leader rather than with the opportunities for change in the leader's environment.

#### AND – only empirics

Rockman 9 Bert, prof of poly sci @ Purdue, Presidential Studies Quarterly vol 39 issue 4, October 2009, da: 7-20-2012

 Although Neustadt shunned theory as such, his ideas could be made testable by scholars of a more scientific bent. George Edwards (e.g., 1980, 1989, 1990, 2003) and others (e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990) have tested Neustadt's ideas about skill and prestige translating into leverage with other actors. In this, Neustadt's ideas turned out to be wrong and insufficiently specified. We know from the work of empirical scientists that public approval (prestige) by itself does little to advance a president's agenda and that the effects of approval are most keenly felt—where they are at all—among a president's support base. We know now, too, that a president's purported skills at schmoozing, twisting arms, and congressional lobbying add virtually nothing to getting what he (or she) wants from Congress. That was a lot more than we knew prior to the publication of Presidential Power. Neustadt gave us the ideas to work with, and a newer (and now older) generation of political scientists, reared on Neustadt but armed with the tools of scientific inquiry, could put some of his propositions to an empirical test. That the empirical tests demonstrate that several of these propositions are wrong comes with the territory. That is how science progresses. But the reality is that there was almost nothing of a propositional nature prior to Neustadt.

Journalists love constructing ‘pc key’ narratives – no basis in real decision-making

Dickinson 9 professor of political science at Middlebury College (Matthew, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” May 26, 2009 Presidential Power http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/]

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

**Obama won’t fight – he has never used political capital**

**Newsweek 10** (“Learning from LBJ,” 3-25, <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/03/25/learning-from-lbj.html>)

It's called "the treatment." All presidents administer it, one way or another. The trick is to use the perks of the office and the power of personality to bring around doubters and foes. LBJ was the most outlandish and sometimes outrageous practitioner. With three televisions blasting in the background, Johnson would get about six inches away from the face of some beleaguered or balky senator or cabinet secretary. Sometimes LBJ would beckon the man into the bathroom and continue to cajole or harangue while he sat on the toilet. Air Force One is a favorite tool presidents use to inspire and overawe. With much guffawing and backslapping, recalcitrant lawmakers are led to a luxurious cabin where they are granted a presidential audience and bestowed with swag, like cuff links with the presidential seal (Johnson gave away plastic busts of himself). Dennis Kucinich, seven-term congressman from Ohio and potential vote-switcher for health reform, was invited aboard Air Force One a couple of weeks before the climactic vote in the House. He had dealt with Presidents Clinton and Bush before, but Obama was different. The president was sitting in shirt sleeves behind a desk, computer to one side, notepad and pen at the ready. "He doesn't twist arms," recalls Kucinich. Rather, the president quietly listened. He was "all business," and sat patiently while Kucinich expressed his concerns, which Obama already knew. Then the president laid out his own arguments. Kucinich wasn't persuaded by the president, he told NEWSWEEK. But he voted for the bill because he did not want the presidency to fail, and he was convinced Obama would work with him in future. A president's first year in office is often a time for learning. The harshest lessons are beginners' mistakes, like the Bay of Pigs fiasco for JFK. The real key is to figure out how to use the prestige of the office to get things done: when to conserve your political capital, and when and how to spend it. Judging from Obama's campaign, which revolutionized politics with its ability to tap grassroots networks of donors and activists, many expected President Obama to go over the heads of Congress and mobilize popular passions to achieve his top priorities. But on what may be his signature issue, that wasn't really the case. Obama came close to prematurely ending his effectiveness as president before finally pulling out the stops. In the last push for the health-care bill, he reminded voters of Obama the candidate, fiery and full of hope. But during the health-reform bill's long slog up and around Capitol Hill, Obama was a strangely passive figure. He sometimes seemed more peeved than engaged. His backers naturally wondered why he seemed to abandon the field to the tea partiers. The answer may be that at some level he just doesn't like politics, not the way Bill Clinton or LBJ or a "happy warrior" like Hubert Humphrey thrived on the press of flesh, the backroom deal, and the roar of the crowd. That doesn't mean Obama can't thrive or be successful—even Richard Nixon was elected to two terms. But it does mean that the country is run by what New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd wryly called "the conquering professor"—a president who leads more from the head than the heart, who often relies more on listening than preaching. Obama entered politics as a community organizer, and as a presidential candidate he oversaw an operation that brilliantly organized from the ground up. So it was a puzzle to Marshall Ganz, a longtime community organizer, that Obama seemed to neglect the basic rule of a grassroots organizer: to mobilize and, if necessary, polarize your popular base against a common enemy. Instead, President Obama seemed to withdraw and seek not to offend while Congress squabbled. "It was a curiously passive strategy," says Ganz, who worked for 16 years with Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers and now teaches at Harvard's Kennedy School. In a way, he says, Obama's "fear of a small conflict made a big conflict inevitable."

Political capital isn’t real – votes are ideological

The Daily Home ’10 (Daily newspaper serving the Talladega and and St. Clair Counties since 1867. It is the leading newspaper for the 2 counties as well as much of the surrounding area (“There is no Such Thing as ‘Political Capital’”, The Daily Home, 27 January 2010. < [http://www.dailyhome.com/view/full\_story/5680369/article-There-is-no-such-thing-as-‘political-capital’?instance=home\_opinion](http://www.dailyhome.com/view/full_story/5680369/article-There-is-no-such-thing-as-%27political-capital%27?instance=home_opinion)>)

After winning one of the closest presidential races in the history of the United States in 2004, President Bush proclaimed, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it.” The president and the GOP thought they had a sure bet. They were wrong. In following elections, the American voters yanked the rug out from under them, first giving Democrats a majority in Congress, then giving them the White House in 2008. In turn, the Democrats, bolstered by those elections, made the same mistake the Republicans did, believing that they had some grand mandate from voters to push their agenda through. Now, if two recent elections are any indication, the pendulum is once again swinging the other way, with Republicans gaining ground. And once again, we are hearing from GOP party leaders that they have earned some “political capital.” Too bad for both parties “political capital” does not exist — never has. In fact, it’s hugely insulting to Americans as a whole for one party or the other to make such a claim. On average, the United States is split about evenly between Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, with a broad margin of moderates between the extremes. And most people are, in real-world situations, conservative on some issues and liberal on others. Very few Americans want unrestricted government spending, which is traditionally a conservative view point, but at the same time, most of those people would support the government providing food to starving children, which is traditionally a liberal approach. So any time one political party thinks it has the upper hand, as the Democrats most recently did, they are wrong. The Democrats mostly won elections because of a national dissatisfaction among moderates with how the GOP majority had managed the country — NOT because the United States had suddenly become a country of Democrats. It was foolish then for Democrat leaders like Speaker Nancy Pelosi to think otherwise and it is equally foolish now for the GOP to repeat that mistake. American voters want government that advances the best interest of its people and its businesses, instead of focusing on one party’s agenda. Given the state of the nation today, neither party has done much to earn anything like “political capital” and certainly neither has any to spend.

**PC is completely irrelevant – nothing passes**

**Packer, 6/12/12** (George, “A FOREIGN-POLICY PRESIDENT,” The New Yorker, <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/06/obama-foreign-policy-2012-election.html#ixzz21nJej1UF>)RK

To a surprising extent, this is still the country that Obama inherited in 2009, the one that George W. Bush led for two terms, even the one that Bill Clinton presided over. Why didn’t Obama’s first term bring transformation that he promised? That will be one for the historians, but the lines of explanation are already clear: The recession was longer and worse than the Administration expected, and for many Americans it’s still going on; the Republicans decided from the start that they would lay all problems at Obama’s door and do as little as possible to help him solve them, a daring as well as immoral strategy that paid off handsomely; the White House seemed completely unprepared for this approach, letting the President’s opponents to define him by August of his first year; Congress, especially the Senate, has **sunk into a state of paralysis** in which the only thing that moves quickly is money. No single President, however gifted, **could bridge the political divide**, because it is real and deep and semi-permanent, and to believe otherwise was profoundly ahistorical.